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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
The objective of this thesis is to examine the effects of three behavioral biases on investment 
advisors. These biases are hindsight bias, overconfidence and self-attribution bias. A survey study is 
carried out to find out how the studied biases affect the investment advisors. The same survey study is 
also carried out for two control groups for comparative purposes. In addition, the effects of individual 
thinking style and cognitive abilities on the exposure to behavioral biases are studied. 
 
DATA  
The data in this study is collected in controlled field surveys. The surveys are carried for three 
separate groups of people; financial professionals, university students and employees of an 
engineering company The participants of the surveys answer a questionnaire that contains financial 
market related estimation tasks.  
 
The main insight of the survey study is the two-pronged structure of the surveys. The ability to 
recollect answers and repeat the surveys enables the examination of the biases at issue. The biases 
are studied by comparing observations from different phases of the surveys to each other. Hindsight 
bias is observed by differences between initial answers and the recollections. Overconfidence is 
studied using initial answers and realized results. Analyses of self-attribution bias use initial answers 
from first and second round. 
 
RESULTS  
The main finding of this study is that people in general are exposed to the studied behavioral biases 
but the degree and impact are affected by experience and other characteristics. Investment advisors 
are generally less exposed to hindsight bias than other people. Moreover, professionals generally 
outperform other people with lower level of confidence, which indicates lower overconfidence. 
However, professionals are most exposed to self-attribution bias. The results indicate that in 
addition to expertise, individual thinking style explains behavioral biases. People with high faith 
in intuition are more exposed to behavioral biases. Overall, the results of this thesis provide 
valuable new information on behavioral biases and investment advisors. 
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1. Introduction 
Investment advisors are professionals who assist their clients in financial decision making issues 
such as investing, insurance, borrowing, taxation and retirement planning. Thus investment 
advisors have a great impact on their clients’ decisions. The advices and recommendations 
investment advisors give to their clients are naturally affected by the beliefs and conceptions they 
possess. Biases in these beliefs and conceptions can strongly affect the decision making of the 
clients and thus it is important to study investment advisors’ behavioral biases. 
 
1.2. Background and Motivation 
Previous literature shows that psychological factors have a substantial effect on people’s 
decision making. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) present that people rely on a limited number of 
heuristic principles which in general are quite useful, but sometimes lead to severe and systematic 
biases. This study focuses to examine three such biases; hindsight bias, overconfidence and self-
attribution bias. 
Hindsight bias refers to a tendency to perceive own performance better than it actually is, 
after learning the realization. Biais and W eber (2008) find that for hindsight biased agents the ex-
post recollection of the initial belief will be closer to the realization than the true ex-ante 
expectation. According to Buksar and Conolly (1988) hindsight bias hinders learning from past 
experience. In a similar vein Biais and W eber (2008) present that hindsight biased agents also fail 
to remember how ignorant they were before observing outcomes and answers This leads agents 
to underestimate volatility, which again results in inefficient portfolio choice and poor risk 
management. One explanation of hindsight bias is the availability heuristic: the event that did 
occur is more salient in one's mind than the possible outcomes that did not. 
Overconfidence refers to the habit of overestimating own ability to perform in given tasks. 
People tend to be overconfident about own capabilities and level of knowledge. Overconfidence 
has several forms, such as ‘better than average’, ‘optimism bias’ and ‘setting too narrow 
confidence limits’. According to Barber and Odean (2000) overconfidence causes excess trading 
which can be risky to financial well being.  
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Self-attribution bias refers to a tendency to overestimate the degree to which people are 
responsible for their own success. Hastorf, Schneider, and Polifka (1970) write, "W e are prone to 
attribute success to our own dispositions and failure to external forces”. In a similar vein, Gervais 
and Odean (2001) find that success of traders leads to increased overconfidence. W hen a trader is 
successful, he attributes too much of his success to his own ability and revises his beliefs about 
his ability upward too much, which increases overconfidence. 
However, the exposure to behavioral biases is not homogenous. Certain factors are reported 
to explain the level of exposure. Lewellen, Lease and Schlarbaum (1977) find that men have 
stronger tendency to overconfident behavior than woman have. Korniotis and Kumar (2007) 
show that overconfidence decreases with age. Kaustia, Alho, and Puttonen (2008) find that 
expertise reduces the degree of anchoring bias. Frederick (2005) presents that people with higher 
cognitive abilities make more optimal decisions. This study uses a rational-experiential test by 
Epstein et al (1996) to characterize individual cognitive ability and thinking style. The effect of 
these psychological information processing styles in behavioral biases is studied.  
 
1.3. Research Questions 
The fact that investment advisers are commonly used when it comes to saving and investing 
raises the question if their behavior is less exposed to behavioral biases than the behavior of their 
potential customers’. Investment advisors have a great impact on the decisions of their customers 
and if their judgment is biased, it will affect the way their customers act on financial markets (see 
e.g. Bluethgen et al., 2007). Irrational decision making can lead to e.g. suboptimal asset 
allocation and thus poor investment results.  
To find out how these biases affect financial decision making, a field survey is conducted. 
The survey is designed to enable studying the three biases. The main insight is the two-phased 
structure of the survey. The biases are studied by comparing observations from different phases 
of the surveys to each other. Hindsight bias is observed by differences between initial answers 
and the recollections. Overconfidence is studied using initial answers and realized results. 
Analyses of self-attribution bias use initial answers from first and second round. The empirical 
study uses the data from the surveys and answers to the following questions: 
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1. How does the hindsight bias affect the ex-post conception of the ex-ante expectation? 
  Do investment advisors suffer from hindsight bias? 
  Does expertise reduce the hindsight bias? 
  W hat characteristics affect the severity of hindsight bias? 
 
2. How does the overconfidence affect the setting of confidence limits? 
  Do investment advisors set too narrow confidence limits? 
  Does expertise reduce overconfidence? 
  W hat characteristics affect the severity of overconfidence? 
 
3. How does the self-attribution bias affect confidence in repeated tasks? 
  Do investment advisors adjust their confidence based on the results? 
  Does expertise reduce the self-attribution bias? 
  W hat characteristics affect the severity of self-attribution bias? 
 
The empirical research is conducted using Finnish investment advisors who can be classified 
as ‘professionals’ as the participants have passed a General Securities Examination organized by 
the Finnish Association of Securities Dealers (FASD). In addition to the professionals, the survey 
is also carried out for two control groups, university students and employees of an engineering 
company (laypeople). 
In relation to the research questions, there are several hypotheses according to which the 
behavior of the respondents is expected to occur. The hypotheses make the manners that the 
behavioral biases suggest concrete. There are also hypothesis for the impacts of certain 
characteristics. The hypotheses of this study are: 
  Hindsight biased people overestimate their initial ability to perform after learning the outcome 
  Overconfident people overestimate their initial ability to perform before a task 
  People suffering from self-attribution bias become more confident after a success 
  Expertise and experience reduce behavioral biases 
o Professionals are least exposed to behavioral biases 
o Students are less exposed to behavioral biases than laypeople 
  High cognitive ability decreases the exposure to behavioral biases 
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1.4. Contribution 
In this thesis I study three behavioral biases of financial industry professionals using a field 
survey. Majority of behavioral finance articles focus on one bias only (e.g. Barber and Odean 
2001). In addition, the use of experimental or survey method is still relatively infrequent in 
financial research. Typical experimental or survey studies on behavioral biases use samples that 
include only students (Buksar and Conolly 1988) or only professionals (Montier 2006). Studies 
comparing financial market professionals and other people are rare and typically concentrate on 
differences between two types of respondents (Kaustia et al 2008 and Törngren and Montgomery 
2004). This thesis uses a sample consisting of three separate groups of people; financial 
professionals, university students and employees of an engineering company. In addition to the 
diversity, the data of this thesis is also rare due timing. The surveys of this thesis are conducted 
during the period of historically high uncertainty in financial markets, at the end of year 2008. 
Some of the methods used in this thesis have not been used before. To demonstrate hindsight 
bias I developed the ‘asset selection’ and ‘sign of return’ methods. The main insight in the new 
methods is in the two-phased structure, which is rarely used (Biais and W eber 2008). The ability 
to recollect answers and repeat the surveys allows studying hindsight bias and self-attribution 
bias in this thesis. Both hindsight bias (Biais and W eber, 2008) and self-attribution bias (Gervais 
and Odean, 2001) are relatively infrequently studied in financial context. Overall, the results of 
this thesis provide valuable new information on behavioral biases and investment advisors. 
 
1.5. Results summary 
This section presents a brief summary on the results of this study. The results of this study 
are in line with following statements:  
  People are exposed to hindsight bias 
  Investment advisors are generally less exposed to hindsight bias than other people 
  Investment advisors have a tendency to exaggerate their initial ability to predict asset 
returns, after learning the realization. The exaggeration reinforces with experience. 
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  People are overconfident 
  Professionals generally outperform other people with lower level of confidence, which 
indicates lower overconfidence 
 
  People suffer from self-attribution bias 
  Investment advisors suffer more from self-attribution bias than other people 
 
  Experience and expertise generally reduce exposure to behavioral biases 
  Analytical thinking does not explain exposure to behavioral biases 
  Faith in intuition explains exposure to behavioral biases 
 
  Female professionals rank high in faith in intuition and bottom in analytical thinking 
  Male professionals rank bottom in faith in intuition and top on analytical thinking 
 
1.6. Structure of the Study 
The structure of the thesis is the following: Section 2 discusses the theoretical background. 
Section 3 describes the data and methods used in the empirical test. Section 4 presents the results. 
Finally, section 5 summarizes the thesis and concludes the results. 
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2. Psychological factors in decision making 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information for the empirical tests that 
are carried out. In this chapter I also describe the studied biases and discus the ways how 
psychological factors affect financial decision making. I also go through the existing literature 
about the issues that are related to this study. 
Previous empirical evidence shows that psychological factors have a substantial effect on 
people’s decision making in several fields, including finance. In their classic study, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) present that people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles in complex 
tasks involving uncertainty. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead 
to severe and systematic biases. Since Tversky and Kahneman (1974) academic research has 
reported numerous different biases. This study focuses on biases affecting individual conception 
of person’s own ability to perform in given tasks. People have a tendency to be optimistic about 
the future and their own ability to make forecasts, which indicates overconfidence. 
Overconfidence leads people to i.e. take too much risk, which has severe consequences in 
financial decision making. 
People also tend to overestimate their own performance to make forecasts after learning the 
outcome. Indeed, people remember their initial estimates to been better than those actually were, 
if asked afterwards. This is called hindsight bias. Hindsight bias and overconfidence are actually 
very close each other; both demonstrate such individual thinking where an agent sees himself 
better than he actually is. The existence of hindsight bias hinders the individual’s composition of 
realistic assumptions about own capabilities and thus strengthens overconfidence. People fail to 
recognize their true capability if the conception of success is based on their own memory. 
People have a tendency to attribute themselves about success but blame external issues for 
failure. This bias, also related to conception about own capabilities is known as self-attribution 
bias. Due to self-attribution bias people fail to recognize their true capability even if they learn 
their success from an unbiased source. Even though people are told about their failure, they keep 
overestimating their own capabilities as they do not attribute the failure for themselves. As a 
result of hindsight and self-attribution bias, it is difficult for people to learn to avoid 
overconfidence. 
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However, some previous studies show that with expertise and experience an individual is 
able to learn to avoid biases. W ithin financial decision making e.g. Kaustia et al (2008) and 
Alevy, Haigh, and List (2007) find that financial market professionals are less exposed to 
behavioral biases than students. However, contradicting results also exists; Haigh and List (2005) 
find that the behavior of traders is more biased than the behavior of students. 
 
2.1. Hindsight bias 
Hindsight bias refers to a tendency to perceive own performance better than it actually is, 
after learning the realization. The first studies of hindsight bias were Fischhoff (1975) and 
Fischhoff and Beyth (1975). Fischhoff (1975) finds that receipt of outcome knowledge affects 
subjects’ judgments in the direction predicted by the tendency to perceive reported outcomes as 
having been relatively inevitable. This tendency was called as ‘creeping determinism’ but is 
nowadays better known as hindsight bias. Fischhoff (1975) concludes that unperceived creeping 
determinism can seriously impair our ability to judge the past or learn from it. In a more recent 
study Biais and W eber (2008) present that for hindsight biased agents the ex-post recollection of 
the initial belief will be closer to the realization than the true ex-ante expectation. Such agents 
also fail to remember how ignorant they were before observing outcomes and answers.  
The effect of hindsight bias on learning has substantial consequences as hindered learning 
leads to increased overconfidence. Camerer et al (1989) suggest that hindsight bias narrows the 
gap between what occurred and what predictions are recalled, reducing valuable feedback and 
inhibiting learning. This in line with the results of Buksar and Conolly (1988), who present also 
that hindsight bias hinders learning from past experience. According to Biais and W eber (2008) 
hindsight bias hinders learning and lead agents to underestimate volatility, which again results in 
inefficient portfolio choice, loss making trades and poor risk management. In their study Biais 
and W eber (2008) arrange a two phase experiment to demonstrate hindsight bias. Their results 
show that people have a tendency to adjust their 2nd phase answers (i.e. the recollection of the 
initial estimates) based on the realization.  
Hindsight bias is not affecting only in unconscious way, like in ex-post evaluation of ex-ante 
decision, but also when subject is aware of the bias. Buksar and Conolly (1988) find that student 
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subjects working on a strategic choice case, both alone and in groups, were unable to ignore what 
they had been told about the actual results of a choice. As a result, they distorted their evaluations 
of the original decision and the factors influencing it.   
Behavior caused by Hindsight bias is also recognized in studies observing other biases. 
Camerer et al (1989), who study judgmental errors in economic settings, find that asymmetric 
information is not always beneficial for the better-informed agent, which violates the common 
assumption of economic analyses. This effect is known as curse of knowledge. According to 
Camerer et al (1989), the curse of knowledge may also influence individual decision making 
under uncertainty. Exaggerating the predictability of events intensifies the regret people feel 
when choices yield outcomes worse than those that would have resulted from forgone options. 
This is in line with hindsight bias as people thinking behind this goes like “I knew this would 
happen, why I didn’t act correctly”. In a similar vein Baron and Hershey (1988) present that the 
curse of knowledge suggests that outcome information will be overused; principals will tend to 
think that ex ante optimal decisions with unfavorable outcomes were nonoptimal and that 
nonoptimal decisions with favorable outcomes were optimal. Camerer et al (1989) continue that 
agents will be excessively penalized for negative outcomes and insufficiently rewarded for 
favorable results. Buksar and Conolly (1988) present that when outcomes are poor, then, people's 
evaluations of earlier decisions tend to be biased in an unflattering direction. "I should have 
known it all along” they feel, puzzled at their poor decision making. 
Traditional way to justify market rationality is to state that even though some investors are 
irrational, markets in total are rational as the individual irrationalities are random and thus on 
average cancel each other out. Camerer et al (1989) found that hindsight bias in markets was half 
as large as bias in individual judgments. Their data suggest that the error-correcting power of 
markets derives not from the feedback they provide, but from the disproportionate activity of 
more rational traders. 
Hindsight bias is also affecting performance evaluation in principal agent relation. 
Mangelsdorff and W eber (1998) and Madarasz (2008) show that, in a principal agent relation, the 
hindsight bias will prevent the principal from correctly evaluating the performance of the agent. 
According to Biais and W eber (2008), biased principals fail to remember what was known when 
the agent’s decision was taken. 
11 
2.2. Overconfidence 
People have a tendency to be overly confident about own capabilities and level of 
knowledge. Psychological research has discovered many ways how overconfidence affects 
human behavior in several fields. The effects of overconfidence are strongly present in difficult 
decisions that include uncertainty. Thus financial decision making is very likely affected by 
overconfidence. Overconfidence appears in several forms, such as ‘better than average’, 
‘optimism bias’ and ‘setting too narrow confidence limits’.  
Studies of overconfidence have typically examined people’s confidence in their ability to 
answer general knowledge questions, but similar results have also been found in financial 
settings. Results imply that people suffer from overconfidence also in financial decision making. 
The effects of overconfidence on financial decisions are serious and can be risky to financial well 
being. According to Lewellen et al (1977) overconfident investors trade more, believe returns to 
be highly predictable and expect higher returns than what less confident people do. In similar 
vein Odean (1998) finds that overconfident investors will overestimate the value of their private 
information, causing them to trade actively. However, active trading does not lead to better 
performance. Indeed, Barber and Odean (2000), who study trading behavior of households, find 
that households that trade frequently earn much lower net annualized geometric mean return than 
those that trade infrequently. Thus overconfidence can be hazardous to individual’s wealth. 
Overconfidence is not affecting only individual investors; also the professionals suffer from 
it. Montier (2006) finds that 74% of fund managers perceive themselves as above average at their 
jobs  while  only  a  small  minority  believes  that  they  are  below  the  average.  Törngren  and  
Montgomery (2004) find that professionals overestimate their probability to choose the better 
performing stock from two alternatives by over 20%. Olsen (1997) finds that professional 
investment managers tend to overestimate probabilities of outcomes that are positive to the 
respondent and to underestimate undesired outcomes. 
 
2.3. Self-attribution bias 
Self-attribution bias refers to a tendency to overestimate the degree to which people are 
responsible for their own success. According to Hastorf, Schneider, and Polifka (1970) people are 
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prone to attribute success to our own dispositions and failure to external forces. In a similar vein 
Gervais and Odean (2001) explain that people assess their own abilities not so much through 
introspection as by observing our successes and failures. Most people tend to take too much 
credit for our own successes.  
Self-attribution bias affects the conception about own capabilities as it hinders the evaluation 
of past performance. This leads to overconfidence. Indeed, Gervais and Odean (2001), who 
studied the effects of past results in traders’ behavior, find that success leads to increased 
overconfidence. W hen a trader is successful, he attributes too much of his success to his own 
ability and revises his beliefs about his ability upward too much, which increases overconfidence. 
Gervais and Odean (2001) also find that both volume and volatility increase with the degree of a 
trader's learning bias. As a result overconfident traders behave suboptimally, thereby lowering 
their expected profits 
Deaves, Lüders, and Schröder (2005) study overconfidence in making stock market 
expectations among German financial professionals. They find that the professionals are not just 
overconfident but their level of overconfidence increases after a successful forecast measured by 
90% confidence interval. In addition, the adjustment to wider confidence interval after failure is 
smaller than the adjustment to narrower interval after success. This results from psychological 
phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, which suggests that people prefer to forget their failures 
and rather remember their successes. Cognitive dissonance is closely related to self-attribution 
bias and also somewhat related to hindsight bias. Even though self-attribution bias aggravates 
overconfidence Gervais and Odean (2001) present that average levels of overconfidence are 
greatest in those who have been trading for a short time. W ith more experience, people develop 
better self-assessments. 
 
2.4. Factors affecting exposure to behavioral biases 
The exposure to behavioral biases is individual; however it is affected by demographic and 
socioeconomic factors. In this chapter I discuss how different characteristics have been found to 
affect behavioral biases. The two characteristics, experience and thinking style, that are in the 
focus of this study are discussed in separate sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. 
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The two most studied and natural demographic factors, gender and age, affect both to the 
degree of exposure to behavioral biases. Psychological research has established that men are 
more prone to overconfidence than women, particularly so in male-dominated realms such as 
finance. Indeed Lewellen et al (1977) find that men have stronger tendency to overconfident 
behavior than woman have. These findings are supported by Barber and Odean (2001), who find 
that men are more active traders, which serves as a proxy for overconfidence. Using the same 
database as Barber and Odean (2001), Korniotis and Kumar (2007) find that older investors have 
better knowledge about investing and hold less risky and more diversified portfolio. This implies 
that overconfidence decreases with age. Korniotis and Kumar (2007) also find that the negative 
age effect is less apparent in the group of individuals with higher education and higher income. 
 
2.4.1. Expertise 
In the economics literature it is commonly believed that more sophisticated subjects behave 
fundamentally differently, as they learn from experience to avoid biases and their behavior is also 
influenced by higher incentives. However, there is no fully coherent evidence in previous 
literature about the effects of expertise on behavioral biases.  
Studies comparing the decision making of financial market professionals to other people find 
that whether or not professionals are less biased depends on the context. According to Bradley 
(1981), people with high degree of perceived expertise in the area of a general knowledge 
question are likely to have unrealistically high expectations of the probability of answering 
correctly. In a similar vein Törngren and Montgomery (2004), who study overconfidence of stock 
market professionals and laypeople, find that both laypeople and professionals were 
overconfident, but the professionals overestimated their ability by a greater margin. Their results 
suggest that the information-based predictions of the professionals do not outperform the simple 
heuristics used by laypeople, although the professionals expect that to happen. Haigh and List 
(2005) find that the floor traders at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) demonstrate a greater 
degree of myopic loss aversion than students. Alevy, Haigh, and List (2007) find that students 
more closely follow Bayes’ rule, whereas CBOT professionals are better at assessing the quality 
of public information, and thus earn higher profits. Kaustia et al (2008) study anchoring effect 
and find that the effect obtained with students is several times higher than the effect obtained 
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with professionals. Thus their results imply that expertise significantly attenuates behavioral 
biases. A series of field experiments utilizing the market for sports memorabilia reported in List 
(2003; 2004a; 2004b; 2006) supports the notion that experience attenuates behavioral biases in 
general. However, it seems that a limit to sophistication exists as Kaustia et al (2008) do not find 
difference among the professionals regardless of the level of experience. 
The evidence among students implies that expertise reduces behavioral biases. Kaustia et al 
(2008) find less sophisticated students to anchor their return estimates more than the group of 
more sophisticated students. In the framing study of Glaser et al (2006) a further comparison 
between students who study finance and those who do not study finance shows that financial 
education decreases the effect of framing. 
 
2.4.2. Cognitive ability and individual thinking style 
Similarly to expertise, individual’s cognitive ability is found to reduce behavioral biases. 
Lubinski and Humphreys (1997) explain that general intelligence or various more specific 
cognitive abilities are important causal determinants of decision making. Frederick (2005), who 
studied how the score of the cognitive reflection test (CRT)1 explains individual’s decision 
making, found that CRT scores are predictive of the types of choices that feature prominently in 
tests of decision-making theories, like expected utility theory and prospect theory.  
In his tests of time preference Frederick (2005) found that people who scored higher on the 
CRT were generally more “patient”; their decisions implied lower discount rates. For short-term 
choices between monetary rewards, the high CRT group was much more inclined to choose the 
later larger reward. It appears that greater cognitive reflection fosters the recognition or 
appreciation of considerations favoring the later larger reward. In the test of risk preference 
Frederick (2005) found that in the domain of gains, the high CRT group was more willing to 
gamble, particularly when the gamble had higher expected value. For items involving losses, the 
                                                  
1 The cognitive reflection test (CRT) refers to a test which is designed to measure individual’s cognitive ability using 
simple tasks for which intuition usually ‘offers’ wrong answer but which can be solved by systematic thinking. An 
example of such task is the “bat and ball” problem (see Nagin and Pogarsky, 2003). High CRT score refers to a 
tendency to think (rational system) whereas low CRT score refer to impulsive decision making (experiential system) 
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high CRT group was less risk seeking; they were more willing accept a sure loss to avoid playing 
a gamble with lower (more negative) expected value. Although discount rates and perceived 
utilities are individual, Frederick’s (2005) findings are so strong2 that they indicate that people 
with higher cognitive abilities are more capable in making optimal decisions. 
In psychological literature it is commonly accepted that people process information by two 
parallel, interactive systems: a rational system and an experiential system (see i.e. Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1983 and W einberger and McClelland, 1991). Based on cognitive-experiential self-
theory (CEST, Epstein 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994), Epstein et al (1996) present a test for cognitive 
ability, called rational-experiential inventory (REI). The REI-test contains two dimensions, one 
measuring analytic-rational processing, and the other measuring intuitive-experiential processing.  
The analytic-rational processing is measured using the need for cognition (NFC) scale of 
Cacioppo and Petty (1982). According to Cacioppo et al., (1996) people with higher NFC are 
found to do better on arithmetic problems, anagrams, trivia tests and college coursework, to be 
more knowledgeable, more influenced by the quality of an argument, to recall more of the 
information to which they are exposed, to generate more “task relevant thoughts” and to engage 
in greater “information-processing activity.” Thus people with high NFC scores can be expected 
to be less exposed to behavioral biases.   
The intuitive-experiential processing is measured using a scale called faith in intuition (FI). 
According to Epstein et al (1996) strong experientiality (high FI score) may interfere with logical 
thinking; that is, people who are strongly experiential tend to accept their heuristic thinking as 
rational. However, the use of heuristics does not necessarily lead to rational behavior (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974). Thus people with high FI scores are expected to be more exposed to 
behavioral biases. 
 
                                                  
2 For example Frederick (2005) found that only 31% of low CRT sample chose 15% change of $1.000.000 (expected 
value $150.000) over certain $500. The respective proportion of high CRT sample was 60%. 
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3. Data and methods 
In order to find answers to the research questions an empirical study is conducted. In this 
section I present the data and methods used in the study. In section 3.1 I describe the 
characteristics of the data and the process of data collection. Section 3.1 also includes a short 
description of the unique period during the surveys. In section 3.2 I discuss the tests that are 
carried to measure the studied biases. 
 
3.1. Data 
The data section is divided into two subsections. The first subsection describes the process of 
how the data is collected. The first subsection also discusses the characteristics of the sample 
groups. The second subsection describes the events of the 2008 finance crisis, which was at its 
peak during the surveys of this study. 
 
3.1.1. Collection of the data 
Data for the empirical study is collected in several controlled field surveys. In these surveys 
the participants are asked to fill a questionnaire. The setting includes two phases for each group. 
Time between the phases is approximately three weeks, depending on group (see table 1). The 
first phase questionnaire contains questions for background information, a rational-experimental 
inventory and three return estimation tasks. The background information questions include sex, 
age and financial experience related questions. The rational-experimental inventory includes ten 
statements about individual thinking style. Based on the answers the thinking style of the 
respondent is charted. The answers for these statements are collected on a one to five scale. The 
complete list of statements can be found on section 3.2.4. In the return estimation tasks the 
respondents are shown a graph that contains the development of two assets’ total return indices in 
last 12 months. The respondents are then asked to choose the better performing asset from the 
pair during an approximately three week period and classify the strength of their view (i.e. the 
certainty that their selection wins) on a one to five scale.  In addition they are asked to give an 
estimate for the return of the better performing asset and set a 90% confidence interval limits for 
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this return. The asset pairs used are Russian vs. Brazilian shares, EUR-GBP vs. EUR-SEK, and 
oil vs. gold
3
. The complete phase one questionnaires can be found from the appendix 7.3. 
In the second phase questionnaire the participants were asked to summon up their initial 
answers and estimates from the first phase. These answers and estimates were then recollected. 
The respondents were told that it is very important that they answer now even though they could 
not remember their initial answers very well. The respondents were also asked to classify how 
well they remember their initial answers. In addition to the recollection, the second phase 
questionnaire also included the same return estimation tasks than the first phase questionnaire, 
naturally with updated return periods. The complete phase two questionnaires can be found from 
the appendix 7.3. The timing of the survey dates and the lengths of the return estimation periods 
are shown in table 1. Phase 1 return estimation periods start on the survey date and end on the 
phase 2 survey date. Phase 2 return estimation periods start on the survey date and end at 
31.12.2008. 
 
 Table 1 – Survey dates and return estimate periods 
 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Length 1 Length 2 
Group 1 (professionals) 25.9.08 20.10.08 25 72 
Group 2 (professionals) 29.9.08 30.10.08 31 62 
Group 3 (professionals) 2.10.08 4.12.08 63 27 
Group 4 (students) 17.10.08 14.11.08 28 47 
Group 5 (laypeople) 30.10.08 27.11.08 28 34 
 
 
3.1.2. Sample characteristics 
The sample of the study includes five separate groups of controlled field survey participants. 
Three of the groups consist of investment advisors working in a Finnish bank, one of students at 
Helsinki School of Economics and one of people working at a large industrial engineering 
company. The three investment advisor groups are merged to a single group for analysis 
purposes. The groups are named as investment advisors, students and laypeople. Respectively the 
                                                  
3 The indices of the assets are: FTSE W  Brazil Euro total return index, FTSE W  Russia Euro total return index, UK £ 
to Euro (W MR&DS) exchange rate, Swedish Krona to Euro (W MR) exchange rate, MLCX Crude Oil (W TI) total 
return index (OFCL), and MLCX Gold total return index (OFCL). The indices are downloaded from Datastream. 
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sizes of the groups are: 56 investment advisors, 89 students, and 55 laypeople. Thus the total 
sample size is 200. 
The overall sample includes 104 men, 95 women and 1 who did not want to reveal his/her 
sex. The respective distributions within the groups are 20 + 35 (+1) investment advisers, 61 + 28 
students and 23 + 32 laypeople. Ages of respondents range between 18 and 65 years. Due to the 
fact that majority of students are 18 to 24 years the overall age distribution is relatively skewed. 
Table 2 presents the age distributions by groups. 
 
 Table 2 – Distribution of age 
Age Inv. adv. Student Laypeople All 
18-24 0 % 84 % 4 % 39 % 
25-29 27 % 11 % 22 % 19 % 
30-34 14 % 0 % 15 % 8 % 
35-39 14 % 1 % 16 % 9 % 
40-44 16 % 2 % 20 % 11 % 
45-49 21 % 1 % 7 % 9 % 
50-54 7 % 0 % 5 % 4 % 
55-59 0 % 0 % 9 % 3 % 
60-65 0 % 0 % 2 % 1 % 
 
 
On average the investment advisors have over ten years of industry experience, the median 
experience is eight years. The distribution of experience is skewed. The majority of investment 
advisors in this study have experience less than ten years but on the other hand many have a long, 
over 20 years experience. Figure 1 shows the distribution of expertise. To demonstrate the 
proportion of inexperienced investment advisors a separate column is drawn for experience of 0 
to 2 years. The investment advisors have passed the first level examination organized by FASD 
and were studying for the second level examination at the time of the data collection.  
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 Figure 1 – Distribution of experience 
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The surveys for the professionals’ sample are held in context of FASD examination training 
sessions. The participants arrive to the first phase sessions without knowing in advance about the 
survey. At the beginning of the training session the participants are asked to voluntarily take part 
in a research. 
The student sample consists of undergraduate students at Helsinki School of Economics. The 
survey is carried out in a corporate finance exercise session that these students attend. The course 
in mandatory for students majoring in finance or accounting, and it typically is their second 
course in finance. All students attend an elementary finance course and have thus been exposed 
to the basics of financial markets, including return and volatility. The students are at the 
beginning of their specialization in university business studies, and have limited work experience 
in financial markets. This student sample is very similar to what Kaustia et al (2008) had in their 
study. 
The laypeople sample consists of employees of a large multinational engineering company. 
The participants are professionals on their own occupation but have limited knowledge on 
finance. The educational background of the participants is relatively typical: 23% of the 
respondents have a university level degree, 38% have college level degree and 39% have 2nd 
level or lower education. Majority of the respondents have either technical or commercial 
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education: 39% have commercial education, 36% have technical and only 25% have some other 
education. The sample includes participants from numerous organizational positions (e.g. senior 
vice president, customer service employee and product responsible engineer).  
The collection of the student and laypeople samples differ a little from the collection of 
professional sample. Similarly to professional sample the participants arrive to the exercise 
session / monthly briefing without prior information about the survey. For practical reasons the 
questionnaires are dealt at the beginning of the session even though the actual time reserved for 
the survey is at the end of the session. At the beginning the participants are briefly told the 
purpose of the questionnaire and that there is time reserved for filling at the end of the session. 
The survey is conducted after the normal agenda. The participants are instructed for the 
questionnaire and told about the second phase. However the participants are not specifically 
asked to remember their answers for the second phase. The participants are also told that all are 
given a small reward for participating4. The setting for second phase is similar to the first phase, 
with the exception that the participants know about the coming survey. 
The students and laypeople were asked if they have made stock market transactions 
themselves. In total 48% of non-professionals had made personal stock market transactions. 
There is no difference between students and laypeople. However, men have more personal 
experience in stock market investments; 56% of men have made transactions whereas only 35% 
of women have. Also the major (students) and education (laypeople) affects; 57% of students 
with finance major have personal experience but only 41% students with other major have. 
W ithin the laypeople sample 60% of respondents with technical education has personal 
investment experience. The respective proportion for respondents with commercial education is 
45%. This rather surprising observation partly results from the fact that only 23% of commercial 
employees have university degree whereas 35% of technical employees have university degree. 
People with university degree generally are in higher positions in work organizations and thus 
have more funds to invest. Accordingly, 69% of respondents with university degree have 
personal investment experience. The respective proportion of people with lower level of 
education is 42%. Figure 2 presents the results in graphical form. 
                                                  
4 All participants receive a stock market related card game at the second phase session. 
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 Figure 2 – Personal investment experience 
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3.1.3. Finance crisis of 2008 
The surveys for the data gathering were held between 25.9.2008 and 27.11.2008. This period 
included elusively violent events and exceptionally strong volatility on the financial markets. For 
example the wide-ranking bankruptcy of Lehman Brother took place only a few days prior to the 
first survey. This most likely affects the thinking of the survey participants, especially the 
professionals. As the reasons that caused the finance crisis of 2008 are wide and complex and 
thus out of the scope of this study, I discuss these issues only very briefly and in a simplifying 
manner. 
The 2008 finance crisis stems from the problems with subprime mortgages that started to 
build up in July 2007. Between 2000 and 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds 
rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%. The reason behind this was an attempt to soften the effects of the 
collapse of the dot-com bubble and of the September 2001 terrorist attacks. These actions 
lowered the cost of capital in the market and made the lending to customers with lower than 
normal refund ability profitable for banks. This resulted a high demand in houses as people who 
had not been able to buy own houses before were now able to do that. The high demand 
transmitted to house prices that increased strongly, eventually causing a bubble. 
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The mortgages granted to subprime debtors were mainly securitized and diversified to a wide 
range of financial market participants. These financial agreements known as mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS), which derive their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, became 
more and more common. The market for the MBS’s worked properly as long the housing prices 
increased, however problems started to build up as prices started to decline and repayment 
failures increased. The values of MBS’s started to deteriorate sharply and the holders had to 
report losses. The fact that MBS’s are difficult to value and have low transparency caused a 
situation where the holders of MBS’s were not able to explicitly report the value of their 
holdings. This caused a market wide lack of thrust and froze the interbank debt market. This 
resulted in a liquidity crisis. 
Insufficient liquidity was the single most important reason behind the bankruptcies of e.g. 
Bear Stearns (March 2008), Lehman Brothers and AIG (September 2008). Even though financial 
institutions faced significant losses from subprime mortgages the lack of thrust and thus 
negligible liquidity was the reason that made those to collapse. The market wide shortage of 
liquidity increased the cost of capital dramatically and thus diminished the investments and 
activities of other than financial sector too. This made the international stock markets to plummet 
rapidly. The return and volatility for each combination of asset and respondent group in this study 
are shown in table 3. Table 3 is divided into two panels; panel A for phase 1 statistics and panel 
B for phase 2 statistics. Figure 3 shows the survey dates on a timeline with return development of 
each asset. 
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 Table 3 – Return statistics 
Panel A: phase 1 Professional 1 Professional 2 Professional 3 Student "Engineer" 
Brazil 
Return -33 % -34 % -22 % -15 % -17 % 
Volatility 143 % 145 % 115 % 112 % 89 % 
Russia 
Return -45 % -45 % -30 % 6 % -12 % 
Volatility 127 % 145 % 116 % 124 % 107 % 
GBP 
Return 1,7 % -1,5 % -5,9 % -6,7 % -7,6 % 
Volatility 12 % 14 % 16 % 16 % 17 % 
SEK 
Return -3,0 % -2,4 % -5,4 % -1,6 % -3,7 % 
Volatility 10 % 11 % 13 % 10 % 14 % 
Oil 
Return -34 % -37 % -41 % -24 % -25 % 
Volatility 74 % 74 % 77 % 79 % 84 % 
Gold 
Return -9 % -16 % -2 % -9 % 14 % 
Volatility 36 % 38 % 40 % 40 % 40 % 
 
 
Panel B: phase 2 Professional 1 Professional 2 Professional 3 Student "Engineer" 
Brazil 
Return -13 % -16 % 6 % -4 % -7 % 
Volatility 88 % 78 % 62 % 75 % 68 % 
Russia 
Return -23 % -33 % -17 % -16 % -23 % 
Volatility 88 % 82 % 54 % 63 % 53 % 
GBP 
Return -19,6 % -18,8 % -10,0 % -12,7 % -14,5 % 
Volatility 17 % 17 % 21 % 17 % 18 % 
SEK 
Return -8,9 % -10,1 % -3,0 % -8,4 % -6,5 % 
Volatility 17 % 17 % 19 % 19 % 20 % 
Oil 
Return -37 % -33 % 3 % -18 % -17 % 
Volatility 86 % 88 % 75 % 90 % 92 % 
Gold 
Return 15 % 23 % 16 % 19 % 8 % 
Volatility 37 % 36 % 31 % 35 % 32 % 
2
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3.2. Methods 
In this chapter I discuss the methods used in the empirical study. The data gathered in the 
controlled field surveys enables a wide range of analyses to be carried out. The structure of the 
survey makes it possible to study the three biases in question. The main insight in formulating the 
tests described in this section is to compare the observations from different phases of the surveys 
to each other. Hindsight bias is observed by differences between initial answers and the 
recollections. Overconfidence is studied using initial answers and realized results. Analyses of 
self-attribution bias use initial answers from first and second round.  
 
3.2.1. Hindsight bias 
In this study the effects of hindsight bias are examined in four aspects of behavior. The tests 
are designed to versatilely utilize the data collected in the survey. The underlying logic for all of 
the four tests is the main attribute of hindsight bias; people tend to percept their own initial 
behavior as more optimal than it actually is after learning the future. 
 
3.2.1.1. Asset selection effect 
The  first  aspect  is  to  study  if  remembering  own  selection  in  a  winner  selection  task  is  
unbiased. This is called ‘asset selection effect’. Asset selection effect refers to an attribute of 
hindsight bias where people tend to remember their initial selection incorrectly in a task where 
they are asked to select a winner from two alternatives. After learning the outcome hindsight 
biased agents remember that they chose the winning asset even though it may not be true.  
The logic behind the asset selection test of this study is based to the effect where hindsight 
biased agents fail to recognize a failure in a winner selection task, like the one in this study. The 
tendency of overestimating own success is measured by comparing the actual proportion of 
correct answers and the respective remembered proportion. Thus this analysis uses the initial 
selections, the recollections of the initial selections and the realized results from the 
questionnaire. Naturally some proportion of the recollections is incorrect simply because the 
respondent has forgotten his/her initial selection. However, these falsely remembered answers 
26 
should distribute randomly and irrespective of the outcome and thus should not affect the results 
related to hindsight bias. 
The statistical significance of the difference between true and remembered proportions of 
successful answers is tested using a difference in proportions z-test. The z-score is calculated 
using equation 1. In the equation p1 refers to the true proportion of successful answers, p2 refers 
to the proportion of respondents who believe they answered correctly, n1 and n2 refer to the sizes 
of the samples. 
 
(1) 
W here, 
 
 
(2) 
 
W here, 
 
(3) 
 
 
3.2.1.2. Sign of return effect 
The second aspect is to study if remembering the sign of own return estimate in return 
estimation task is unbiased. This is called ‘sign of return effect’. The logic of this analysis is an 
attribute of hindsight bias where people tend to remember the sign of their initial return estimate 
incorrectly. After learning the realized return hindsight biased agents remember that they 
estimated the sign of return correctly even though it may not be true.  The method and logic in 
this test are similar to the assets selection test. The only difference is that hindsight bias is 
measured from the sign of a return estimate instead of asset selection. The tendency of 
overestimating own success is measured by comparing the actual proportion of correctly 
estimated sign of return and the respective remembered proportion. The statistical significance of 
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the difference between true and remembered proportions of correct sign of return is tested using 
the exact same difference in proportions z-test as in asset selection test. 
 
3.2.1.3. Drift of return effect 
The third aspect is to study a tendency of remembering own initial estimates to be closer to 
the realized figures than they actually are (i.e. moving closer to realized). This is done by 
comparing the actual return estimates, the recollections of the actual estimates, and the realized 
returns. In this design the subjects are first asked to report their ex-ante expectations at the first 
phase of the survey. Then, they learn the realization of the return at the second phase. Finally 
they are asked to report their ex-post recollection of their ex-ante expectations. 
The difference between the initial return estimate and the recollection is calculated for each 
respondent. To demonstrate hindsight bias the sample is divided into two groups based on the 
initial answer – realization relationship. Such answers in which the initial estimate is higher than 
the realized result form the first group. Answers in which the initial estimate is lower than the 
realized result form the other group. The logic in this structure is to separate the answers based on 
which direction the ‘drift’ is likely to affect.  
To test the statistical significance of the differences between initial answers and the 
recollections a paired t-test is used. The t-stat is calculated using equation 4. In the equation x1 
refers to the initial return estimate, x2 to  the  recollected  version,  sD refers to the standard 
deviation in the group of  x2-x1, and N is the sample size. 
 
(4) 
 
 
3.2.1.4. Strength of view effect 
The fourth aspect studied is the change of confidence, which in this study is represented by 
the strength of the view score. This aspect is studied by comparing the initial strengths of the 
view, their recollections, and realized returns. The main interest is in the alteration between the 
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initial strength of view and the recollection, not in the actual level of confidence. To demonstrate 
hindsight bias the sample is divided into two groups based on success of the asset selection task. 
The other group is the ones with believed correct answer and the other is the ones with believed 
incorrect answer. The logic behind this is an attribute of hindsight bias according to which people 
that believe they answered correctly may overestimate their initial certainty and people that 
believe they answered incorrectly may underestimate it. The difference between the initial 
strength of view and the recollection is tested and the statistical significance is determined using 
the same paired t-test method as in drift of return test. 
 
3.2.2. Overconfidence 
Overconfidence is studied in two sets of tests. The first set of tests observes the ‘setting too 
narrow limits’ –effect by examining how the respondents estimate volatility. The second set of 
tests observes the relation between perceived confidence and actual ability to success in asset 
selection task.  
The first aspect of overconfidence, ‘setting too narrow limits’ effect, is studied by collecting 
90% confidence boundaries for return in the return estimation tasks. In the simplest analysis 
overconfidence is measured as the difference between the actual hit rate and 90%. This simple hit 
rate comparison test is however vulnerable to extraordinary market conditions (see section 3.1.3) 
and thus overconfidence is also measured by observing the estimated volatilities. The 90 % 
confidence boundaries are converted to volatility estimates using the following equation 5: 
 
 
(5) 
 
W here, 
s = width of the spread (upper limit – lower limit) 
N = Probability as standard deviations in standardized normal distribution (z) 
T = duration of the estimation period (days) 
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The fact that the surveys were held on different dates and the estimation periods were 
unequally lengthy makes accurate volatilities difficult to calculate. Also the sample sizes for 
separate asset – return period combinations would be very small.  For these reasons a simplified 
analysis is carried out. In this analysis the three investment advisor groups are pooled together 
and the volatilities for each asset class are calculated by averaging the individual volatilities of an 
asset-time combination. Student and laypeople samples are issued separately but the volatilities 
for each asset class are also calculated with the same method. These converted and averaged 
volatility estimates are compared to realized and previous volatilities. 
The second set of overconfidence analyses uses a logit-regression to forecast success in 
picking the better performing asset. Logit-regression is a convenient way to demonstrate the 
effects of certain variables on a probability to succeed in a binary task. For the purpose of this 
study logit-regression is appropriate method to study which factors contribute to the probability 
that a respondent chooses the better performing asset from the two alternatives. The regression 
uses the binary variable of success as the response (dependent) variable. The used explanatory 
(independent) variables for the regression are determined based on the collected background 
information. In addition to background information the strength of view score is used in the 
regression. The main interest in the regression analysis is to study the effect of confidence 
(strength of view score) on performance. A negative impact on the probability to succeed would 
be a strong sign of overconfidence. Also the independency of success from strength of view is 
interpreted as overconfidence. 
The statistical significance of the regression coefficients is tested using a W ald test. The 
W ald score is calculated using equation 6. The score is compared against a chi-square 
distribution. 
 
(6) 
 
W here, 
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As the relation of confidence and success is studied and existence of overconfidence is 
determined based on this relation, it is important to study factors affecting confidence. For this 
reason an ordinary least square regression is carried. The purpose of this regression is to discover 
factors affecting confidence. An increase in confidence for some variable while the same variable 
lowers performance, indicate overconfidence. Thus the results of this OLS-regression are 
compared to results of the logit-regression. The regression uses the strength of view score as the 
response (dependent) variable for confidence. The used explanatory (independent) variables are 
gender, profession and the thinking style scores NFC and FI. The significance of the results is 
demonstrated using standard t-test. 
 
3.2.3. Self-attribution bias 
The effects self-attribution bias of are studied in two tests. Both tests measure self-attribution 
bias by the change in perceived certainty of success between first and second rounds. The 
difference is in the determination of success. First test uses individual answers whereas second 
test uses   pooled answers for a single person. 
In the first test a respondent’s recollected certainty (strength of view score) of an individual 
task at phase 1 is compared to the given certainty to the repetition of the same task. Self-
attribution bias is determined by the difference between these scores. The analysis uses 
recollection instead of initial strength of view score to eliminate effects of hindsight bias to this 
analysis. To demonstrate self-attribution bias the sample is divided into two, based on the 
perceived correctness of the initial answer. The logic in this is an attribute of self-attribution bias 
according to which people that believe to be successful attribute themselves on the success and 
thus increase their confidence on a repetition of the task.  On the contrary people who believe to 
be unsuccessful may decrease their confidence on a repetition of the task. The statistical 
significance of these differences is calculated using a similar paired t-test as with hindsight bias 
analyses. 
The second test is similar to the first test with exception that the respondents are categorized 
into four groups based on how many correct answers they believe they had on the first round. The 
change of confidence in each group is observed using the same method of calculating the 
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difference in the strength of view score between phase 1 (recollection) and phase 2. Also 
similarly to other tests in this study, the significance of the differences is calculated using a paired 
t-test. 
 
3.2.4. Rational-experiential inventory 
This section presents the rational-experiential inventory and the calculation of Need for 
Cognition (NFC) and Faith in Intuition (FI) scores. The calculation of the scores is based on the 
inventory consisting of ten statements. The answers for these statements are collected on a one to 
five scale. The following list shows the statements. The score to which the statement is related is 
reported in parenthesis after the statement. The order of the statements is randomized. The 
marking of (R) after the statement refers to the reverse nature of the statement. 
1. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction (NFC) (R) 
2. I trust my initial feelings about people (FI) 
3. I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than something that 
requires little thought (NFC) 
4. I believe in trusting my hunches (FI) 
5. I prefer complex to simple problems (NFC) 
6. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something (NFC) (R) 
7. W hen it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my "gut feelings" (FI)  
8. My initial impressions of people are almost always right (FI)  
9. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking (NFR) (R) 
10. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I can't explain how I know (FI) 
 
The scores are calculated using the equations 7 and 8 (subscript number refers to the 
question). Reversed questions naturally have negative impact on the total score. To transform the 
answers on a scale from -2 to +2, three is deducted from all the actual scores. The reason for this 
is to create a scale distributed evenly around zero. 
NFC = -(score1 - 3) + (score3 - 3) + (score5 - 3) - (score6 - 3) - (score9 -  3)    (7) 
FI = (score2 -3 ) + (score4 - 3) + (score7 - 3) + (score8 -3 ) + (score10 -3  )    (8) 
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4. Results 
The results section presents the results from the tests described in section 3.2. In addition to 
the plain presentation of the result I discuss the possible reasons behind the results and the 
consequences. The interconnection between the biases and possibly explanatory characteristics is 
also discussed. The first three subsections discuss the actual behavioral biases observed in this 
study. These sections are considered as the main contribution of this study. In addition the results 
from the psychological test are presented in the last subsection. 
As investment advisors are the most important sample of this study and stock market 
estimates are most usual for investment advisors, separate analyses on investment advisors’ stock 
market estimates are carried. For several of the tests, there are such extra analyses after the actual 
results discussion. These analyses use the same methods as the actual tests but focus on the 
impacts of professionals’ biases on their occupation. 
 
4.1. Hindsight bias 
The effects of hindsight bias are studied in four different tests. The results of the first two 
tests, ‘asset selection’ and ‘sign of return’, are considered as main contribution of the hindsight 
bias section of this study. However results from the latter two tests, drift of return and strength of 
view also support the analysis of hindsight bias. The techniques used are discussed in more detail 
in section 3.2.1. 
 
4.1.1. Asset selection effect 
Asset selection effect refers to an attribute of hindsight bias where people remember their 
initial  selection  incorrectly  in  a  task  where  they  are  asked  to  select  a  winner  from  two  
alternatives. Hindsight biased agents remember that they chose the winning asset even though it 
may not be true. In this study asset selection effect is tested by comparing the true and 
remembered proportions of correct answers in the asset selection tasks. Table 4 shows the results 
from the test. The purpose of table 4 is to show the initial selections in relation to recollected 
versions of the selections. Thus both true and remembered proportions of successful answers in 
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the asset selection tasks are shown, as well as the difference. To discover the statistical 
significance of the results a difference on proportions z-test is carried out. ‘True’ sample consists 
of all answers that included the selection of asset and the ‘remembered’ sample consists of all 
answers that included the selection of asset and the recollection. Thus the total sample sizes are 
588 and 367. The sizes of the subsamples may vary depending on the number of rejected answers 
sheets. 
34 
Table 4 – Hindsight bias, asset selection effect 1/3 
Table 4 reports both True and Remembered proportions of successful answers in the asset selection tasks. True 
refers to the actual percentage of correct answers whereas Remembered refers to the percentage of answers 
perceived correct in the recollection. Diff. indicates the difference between the two proportions, Remembered less 
True. The score of a difference on proportions z-test is reported in parentheses. The table is divided in four 
panels, A, B, C, and D, in which the results of partitioned sample are shown.  
 
Panel A: Sample Partitioned Based on Profession 
 Success %  
 True Remembered Diff. 
Professionals 63 % 67 % 4 % 
 (N = 166) (N = 158) (0,72) 
    
Students 44 % 59 % 15 %*** 
 (N = 258) (N = 107) (2,62) 
    
Laypeople 45 % 55 % 10 %* 
  (N = 164) (N = 102) (1,65) 
 
Panel B: Sample Partitioned Based on Need for Cognition Score 
 Success %  
 True Remembered Diff. 
NFC < 2 (low) 52 % 65 % 14 %** 
 (N = 190) (N = 106) (2,25) 
    
2 < NFC < 6 51 % 59 % 8 % 
 (N = 231) (N = 165) (1,60) 
    
NFC > 6 (high) 45 % 61 % 17 %*** 
 (N = 161) (N = 96) (2,60) 
 
Panel C: Sample Partitioned Based on Faith in Intuition Score 
 Success %  
 True Remembered Diff. 
FI < 1 (low) 53 % 56 % 3 % 
 (N = 160) (N = 111) (0,54) 
    
1 < FI < 5 48 % 60 % 12 %** 
 (N = 229) (N = 148) (2,22) 
    
FI > 5 (high) 48 % 69 % 21 %*** 
 (N = 193) (N = 108) (3,49) 
 
Panel D: Sample Partitioned Based on Gender 
 Success %  
 True Remembered Diff. 
Female 50 % 65 % 16 %*** 
 (N = 273) (N = 188) (3,32) 
    
Male 49 % 57 % 8 %* 
 (N = 312) (N = 176) (1,70) 
 
Statistical significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, ***  = 1% 
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All partitions of the sample show a positive effect in change between remembered and true 
rate of success. However, for some partitions the difference is not statistically significant. Panel 
A shows the results for each respondent group. The professionals sample shows only a 4 % 
difference which is not statistically significant even at 10 percent significance level (z = 0.72). 
Students sample shows a 15 percent difference that is highly significant (z = 2.62, p < 0.01). 
Laypeople sample shows a 10 percent difference that is significant at 10 percent significance 
level (z = 1.65). Based on these results professionals seem to be the least exposed and student the 
most exposed group, laypeople lay in between. The fact that professionals are least exposed to 
asset selection effect supports the hypothesis that expertise reduces behavioral biases. However, 
the support is only weak as students show stronger exposure than laypeople, although the 
hypothesis that students possess more expertise than so called laypeople is not a strong one. 
The effect of individual thinking style on asset selection effect is not unambiguous. The 
Need for Cognition (NFC) score, that represents analytical thinking, does not explain asset 
selection effect linearly. Panel B presents that both high and low NFC-score partitions show 
statistically significant difference between true and remembered success rates but not for the 
middle partition. The low 30 percent NFC sample shows a 14 percent difference that is 
significant at 5 percent significance level (z = 2.25). The middle 40 percent sample shows an 8 
percent difference (z = 1.60). The high 30 percent sample shows a 17 percent difference that is 
highly significance (z = 2.60, p < 0.01). These results do not support the hypothesis that 
analytical thinking reduces behavioral biases. 
Unlike analytical thinking, faith in intuition shows a straightforward relationship between 
asset selection effect and individual thinking style. Faith in Intuition (FI) score seems to explain 
asset selection effect linearly. Panel C shows the results from tests on sample partitioned based 
on FI-score. The low 30 percent FI sample shows only a 3 percent difference between true and 
remembered success rates. The difference is not significant even at 10 percent significance level 
(z = 0.54). The middle 40 percent sample shows a 12 percent difference that is significant at 5 
percent level (z = 2.22). Finally the high 30 percent sample shows up to 21 percent difference 
that is highly significant (z = 3.49, p < 0.01). The results in panel C imply that there is a strong 
relationship between faith in intuition and behavioral biases. 
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Also a gender-effect seems to exist. Panel D shows the results partitioned by gender. The 
female sample shows a 16 percent difference between true and remembered success rates. The 
difference is highly significant (z = 3.32, p < 0.01). The respective difference for men is 8 percent 
which is significant at 10 percent significance level (z = 1.70). 
Overall the results in table 4 indicate that people find themselves succeeding more often they 
actually do. This supports the evidence that people suffer from hindsight bias. I find that this 
effect represents a strong form of hindsight bias. It requires more ‘I knew it all along’ kind of 
thinking to alter one’s binary choice of selection than simply adjust a linear estimate to meet the 
realization. The chosen asset is also more concrete and thus easier to remember than a return 
estimate in a number format. In a binary selection task the subject can only make a right or wrong 
choice. 
Another issue that can be seen from table 4 is the performance of each group. The 
performance is measured as the percentage of total correct answers not depending whether it is 
correctly remembered. The professionals are correct in 63 % of tasks, students 44 % and 
laypeople 45 %. As simple coin toss is correct 50% of times, the only group outperforming pure 
randomness is the professionals group. 
The results in panel A of table 4 support the hypothesis  that expertise reduces behavioral 
biases. However the fact that students, that are hypothesized to posses more expertise than 
laypeople, seem to be the most exposed group raises a question on the sub-profession differences 
on expertise. To answer this question a further analysis on experience is also carried out. Table 5 
reports the same difference between true and remembered success rates as table 4, with the 
exception that each of the profession samples are further partitioned based on expertise related 
variables. 
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Table 5 – Hindsight bias, asset selection effect 2/3 
Table 5 reports both True and Remembered proportions of successful answers in the asset selection tasks. True 
refers to the actual percentage of correct answers whereas Remembered refers to the percentage of answers 
perceived correct in the recollection. Diff. indicates the difference between the two proportions, Remembered less 
True. The score of a difference on proportions z-test is reported in parentheses.  
 
 Success %  
 True Remembered Diff. 
Professionals    
Experience < 5 years 65 % 68 % 3 % 
 (N = 63) (N = 57) (0,39) 
    
Experience > 5 years 62 % 66 % 4 % 
 (N = 103) (N = 101) (0,63) 
    
Training  69 % 69 % -1 % 
 (N = 39) (N = 35) (-0,06) 
    
No Training 61 % 67 % 5 % 
 (N = 127) (N = 123) (0,86) 
Students    
Finance Major 50 % 57 % 7 % 
 (N = 105) (N = 51) (0,86) 
    
Own Experience 50 % 57 % 7 % 
 (N = 60) (N = 30) (0,60) 
    
No Own Exp. 49 % 57 % 8% 
 (N = 45) (N = 21) (0,62) 
    
Other Major 40 % 61 % 21 %*** 
 (N = 153) (N = 56) (2,68) 
    
Own Experience 49 % 62 % 12 % 
 (N = 65) (N = 26) (1,06) 
    
No Own Exp. 33 % 60 % 27%*** 
 (N = 88) (N = 30) (2,61) 
    
Own Experience 50 % 59 % 9 % 
 (N = 125) (N = 56) (1,16) 
    
No Own Experience 38 % 59 % 20 %** 
 (N = 133) (N = 51) (2,50) 
Laypeople    
Own Experience 43 % 49 % 6 % 
 (N = 81) (N = 59) (0,70) 
    
No Own Experience 46 % 63 % 17 %* 
 (N = 83) (N = 43) (1,81) 
 
Statistical significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, ***  = 1% 
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The sub-profession results of the professional sample are somewhat equal with each other 
and in line with the total professional sample results. The difference between true and 
remembered success rates for any of the four sub-groups is not statistically significant even at 10 
percent significance level. A minor difference is in training variable. Those professionals who 
have participated in a behavioral finance seminar (prior to the survey session), show a practically 
0 percent difference between true and remembered success rates (z = -0.06). However, the 
respective difference for professionals who have not participated in such seminar is 5 percent 
which is not significant (z = 0.86). Even though the observation is weak, it supports the 
hypothesis that expertise reduces behavioral biases. 
The sub-profession results of the student and laypeople samples seem to be rather volatile for 
segregation based on expertise. In the student sample major of the respondent and personal 
investment experience seem to explain the exposure to asset selection effect well. Students 
studying finance as their major have a 7 percent difference between true and remembered success 
rates, which is not significant (z = 0.86). On the contrary students with other than finance major 
show a 21 percent difference, which is highly significant (z = 2.68, p < 0.01). In a similar vein 
students that have personal investment experience show a 9 percent difference, which is not 
significant (z = 1.16). Students who do not have personal investment experience show a 20 
percent difference, which is significant at 5 percent significance level (z = 2.50). These results 
support the hypothesis that expertise and experience reduce behavioral biases. 
Similarly to the student sample, the sub-profession results of the laypeople sample are 
affected by personal investment experience. Respondents that have personal investment 
experience show only a 6 percent difference between true and remembered success rates. This 
difference is not significant even at ten percent significance level (z = 0.70). On the contrary 
respondents that do not have personal investment experience show a 17 percent difference, which 
is significant at 10 percent significance level (z= 1.81). Also these results support the hypothesis 
that experience reduces behavioral biases. 
Overall the results in table 5 support the hypothesis that expertise reduces behavioral biases. 
However, if expertise truly reduces behavioral biases, the hypothesis that students posses more 
expertise that so called laypeople cannot be accepted per se. The results in table 5 show that there 
are significant differences inside student and laypeople samples. This suggests that considering 
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exposure to behavioral biases it is meaningful if a person truly is familiar with financial context 
through personal investment experience or education. The group a person is otherwise 
categorized to is not important. Both inexperienced laypeople and students (no personal 
investment experience or finance major) are most exposed to asset selection effect, students being 
even more exposed than laypeople. To further analyze this observation the student and laypeople 
samples are pooled together and then divided based on personal experience. Table 6 presents 
these results. 
 
Table 6 – Hindsight bias – asset selection effect 3/3 
Table 6 reports both True and Remembered proportions of successful answers in the asset selection tasks. True 
refers to the actual percentage of correct answers whereas Remembered refers to the percentage of answers 
perceived correct in the recollection. Diff. indicates the difference between the two proportions, Remembered less 
True. The score of a difference on proportions z-test is reported in parentheses. The table is divided in two panels, 
A and B in which the results of partitioned sample are shown. To demonstrate the effects of expertise in more 
detail, professionals are excluded from the sample in both panels. Finance students are excluded in panel B. 
 
Panel A: Students and Laypeople 
 Success %  
 True Remembered Diff. 
    
Own Experience  47 % 54 % 7 % 
 (N = 206) (N = 115) (1,17) 
    
No Own Experience 41 % 61 % 19 %*** 
 (N = 216) (N = 94) (3,15) 
 
Panel B: Students less finance majors and Laypeople 
 Success %  
 True Remembered Diff. 
    
Own Experience 46 % 53 % 7 % 
 (N = 146) (N = 85) (1,03) 
    
No Own Experience 39 % 62 % 22 %*** 
 (N = 171) (N = 73) (3,22) 
 
Statistical significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, ***  = 1% 
 
 
The results of the pooled sample of students and laypeople (Panel A) present further 
explanation on the impact of experience on behavioral biases. People with personal investment 
experience show a 7 percent difference between true and remembered success rates. The 
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difference not significant at 10 percent significance level (z = 1.17). The respective difference for 
people without personal investment experience is 19 percent which is highly significant (z = 3.15, 
p < 0.01). The evidence on experience’s bias reducing tendency is strong. The results in Panel B, 
which excludes answers of finance major students, present even stronger influence of experience. 
People with personal investment experience show also a 7 percent difference between true and 
remembered success rates. The difference not significant at 10 percent significance level (z = 
1.03). However, people without personal investment experience show a 22 percent difference. 
The difference is highly significant (z = 3.22, p < 0.01). This strengthens the evidence that 
experience reduces behavioral biases. 
Another way to observe asset selection effect is to compare the realized and recollected 
distributions of the total number of correct answers of an individual. The logic is that hindsight 
bias may affect the perceived number of correct answers and thus the recollected distribution may 
deviate from the realized. According to the hindsight bias hypothesis the distribution should be 
more tilted towards high number of correct answers. Due to the relatively low number of 
respondents in separate groups, this analysis is done to a pooled sample, including all respondents 
with all three initial answers and their recollections. ‘Realized’ refers to the proportion of 
respondents who had the respective number of correct answers. ‘Recollected’ refers to the 
proportion of respondents who perceived to have the respective number of correct answers. 
‘Diff.’ indicates the difference between ‘Realized’ and ‘Recollected (Recollected less Realized). 
To demonstrate statistical significance a difference in proportions z-test score is calculated. 
Figure 4 shows the results of this test. 
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 Figure 4 – Hindsight bias, asset selection effect 
 
0 correct 1 correct 2 correct 3 correct
Realized 8,6 % 42,2 % 35,3 % 13,8 %
Recollected 3,4 % 31,0 % 47,4 % 18,1 %
Diff. -5,2 % -11,2 % 12,1 % 4,3 %
z-stat -1,65 -1,77 1,87 0,90
0 %
5 %
10 %
15 %
20 %
25 %
30 %
35 %
40 %
45 %
50 %
Distribution of correct answers
 
 
As can be seen from figure 4 people tend to report a higher number of correct answers in the 
recolection than they actually got right. This is in line with the hypothesis and also with the 
results discussed above. There seems to be a verge of good and bad result between one and two 
correct answers. People are reluctant to recognize the fact that they have only zero or one correct 
answer and rather believe that they have two or three correct answers. Difference between true 
and believed proportions for zero correct answers is -5.2%, which is significant at ten percent 
significance level (z = -1.65). The respective difference for one correct answer is -11.2%, which 
is also significant at ten percent significance level (z = -1.77). For two correct answers the 
difference is positive, 12.1%. The difference is significant at ten percent level (z = 1.87). For 
three correct answers the difference is 4.3%, which however is not significant (z = 0.90). 
 
* * * 
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4.1.2. Sign of return effect 
Sign of return effect refers to an attribute of hindsight bias where people remember the sign 
of their initial return estimate incorrectly in a task where they are asked to predict the return of an 
asset. Hindsight biased agents remember that they were able to predict the sign of the return 
correctly even though it may not be true. Sign of return effect is tested by comparing the true 
proportion of correctly estimated signs of return (‘True’) and remembered proportion of correct 
sign of return (‘Remembered’) in return estimation task. Table 7 shows the results from the test. 
The purpose of table 7 is to demonstrate the difference between ‘True’ and ‘Remembered’ 
proportions of correctly estimated signs of return. To discover the statistical significance of the 
differences a difference on proportions z-test is carried out. The approach to this analysis is 
similar to the asset selection analysis in section 4.1.1.  
The conditions for answers to be included in sign of return sample are: firstly it contains the 
selection of asset and the recollection; secondly it contains the return estimate and recollection in 
correct format; and thirdly the recollection of asset selection is equal to the initial selection. The 
reasons for first and second conditions are obvious, the reason for the third condition is in 
eliminating the asset selection effect. Thus the sample size in the first phase is 428 and 264 in the 
second phase. The sample consists of answers by 145 respondents. 
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Table 7 – Hindsight bias, sign of return effect 1/2 
Table 7 reports both ‘True’ and ‘Remembered’ proportions of correct signs in the return estimation tasks. True 
refers to the actual percentage of correct signs of return whereas Remembered refers to the percentage of signs of 
return perceived correct in the recollection. Diff. indicates the difference between the two proportions, 
Remembered less True. The score of a difference on proportions z-test is reported in parentheses. The table is 
divided in four panels, A, B, C, and D, in which the results of partitioned sample are shown.  
 
Panel A: Sample Partitioned Based on Profession 
 Predicted correctly %  
 True Remembered Diff. 
Professionals 11 % 23 % 12 %*** 
 (N = 166) (N = 121) (2,64) 
    
Students 19 % 26 % 7 % 
 (N = 145) (N = 65) (1,12) 
    
Laypeople 24 % 23 % -1 % 
  (N = 117) (N = 78) (-0,14) 
 
Panel B: Sample Partitioned Based on Need for Cognition Score 
 Predicted correctly %  
 True Remembered Diff. 
NFC < 2 (low) 16 % 24 % 8 % 
 (N = 128) (N = 72) (1,40) 
    
2 < NFC < 6 18 % 22 % 4 % 
 (N = 183) (N = 129) (0,97) 
    
NFC > 6 (high) 19 % 27 % 8 % 
 (N = 113) (N = 63) (1,30) 
 
Panel C: Sample Partitioned Based on Faith in Intuition Score 
 Predicted correctly %  
 True Remembered Diff. 
FI < 1 (low) 16 % 17 % 1 % 
 (N = 126) (N = 87) (0,26) 
    
1 < FI < 5 19 % 27 % 8 % 
 (N = 162) (N = 97) (1,44) 
    
FI > 5 (high) 17 % 28 % 11 %* 
 (N = 136) (N = 80) (1,85) 
 
Panel D: Sample Partitioned Based on Gender 
 Predicted correctly %  
 True Remembered Diff. 
Female 17 % 25 % 8 %* 
 (N = 214) (N = 141) (1,84) 
    
Male 18 % 23 % 4 % 
 (N = 211) (N = 123) (0,94) 
 
Statistical significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, ***  = 1% 
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All partitions of the sample, excluding laypeople, show a positive effect in change between 
remembered and true rate of success in estimating the sign of return. However, the differences are 
statistically significant only for three subsamples. Panel A shows the results for each respondent 
group. Interestingly professionals show the greatest difference between true and remembered 
success rates. The professionals sample shows a 12 % difference which is statistically highly 
significant (z = 2.64, p < 0.01). Students sample shows a 7 percent difference that is not 
significant at 10 percent significance level (z = 1.12). Laypeople sample shows a -1 percent 
difference that is not significant at 10 percent significance level (z = -0.14). The slightly negative 
difference on laypeople can be interpreted as zero. The fact that professionals seem to be the most 
exposed group can be partly explained by the timing of the surveys. As described in section 3.1 
the market conditions were somewhat abnormal during the surveys, especially during the 
professionals’ surveys. The realized returns of the assets in the professionals’ surveys were 
negative in 17 out of 18 cases. The respective proportion for both students and laypeople is 1/6. 
This combined to the fact that most of the estimates had a positive sign (92% of professionals, 
80% of students, and 91% of laypeople) makes the comparison between respondent groups 
difficult. The large proportion of positive signs under the prevailed market conditions is 
interesting itself. It most likely results from optimism bias which however is not discussed here. 
The incomparability of the groups does not however reduce the reliability of the finding that 
investment advisors seem to have a tendency to perceive themselves being able to predict signs of 
asset returns even though it might not be realistic. 
The level of analytical thinking, measured by the Need for Cognition (NFC) score, does not 
explain sign of return effect linearly. Panel B shows that both high and low NFC-score partitions 
show higher difference between true and remembered success rates than the middle partition. 
However, the difference is not significant for any of the groups. The low 30 percent NFC sample 
shows an 8 percent difference (z = 1.40). The middle 40 percent sample shows a 4 percent 
difference (z = 0.97). The high 30 percent sample shows an 8 percent difference (z = 1.30). These 
results are in line with the results from the asset selection test and thus do not support the 
hypothesis that analytical thinking reduces behavioral biases. 
In contrast to analytical thinking, faith in intuition (FI) score seems to explain sign of return 
effect linearly. Panel C shows the results from tests on sample partitioned based on FI-score. The 
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low 30 percent FI sample shows only a 1 percent difference between true and remembered 
success rates. The difference is not significant even at 10 percent significance level (z = 0.26). 
The middle 40 percent sample shows an 8 percent difference that is not significant at 10 percent 
level (z = 1.44). The high 30 percent sample shows an 11 percent difference that is significant at 
10 percent significance level (z = 3.49). Even though the differences are not very significant the 
results in panel C support the relationship between faith in intuition and behavioral biases. The 
results are also in line with the results in asset selection test. 
Gender seems to affect also in sign of return effect. Panel D shows the results partitioned by 
gender. The female sample shows an 8 percent difference between true and remembered success 
rates. The difference is significant at 10 percent significance level (z = 1.84). The respective 
difference for men is 4 percent which is not significant at 10 percent significance level (z = 0.94). 
Similarly to asset selection, the results from sign of return tests indicate that people find 
themselves succeeding more often they actually do which supports the evidence that people 
suffer from hindsight bias. However, the significance is not as high as it is for asset selection 
effect. The surprising observation on professionals’ exposure to sign of return effect is a valuable 
finding.  
Due to the unequal timing of the surveys (described above) the effects of expertise and 
experience cannot be observed reliably by comparing the results of separate groups. In order to 
find how expertise and experience affect sign of return effect a further analysis is carried out. 
Table 8 reports the same difference between true and remembered success rates as table 7, with 
the exception that each of the profession samples are further partitioned based on expertise 
related variables. 
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Table 8 – Hindsight bias, sign of return effect 2/2 
Table 8 reports both True and Remembered proportions of correct signs in the return estimation tasks. True refers 
to the actual percentage of correct signs of return whereas Remembered refers to the percentage of signs of return 
perceived correct in the recollection. Diff. indicates the difference between the two proportions, Remembered less 
True. The score of a difference on proportions z-test is reported in parentheses. 
 
 Predicted correctly %  
 True Remembered Diff. 
Professionals    
Experience < 5 years 14 % 18 % 4 % 
 (N = 63) (N = 50) (0,54) 
    
Experience > 5 years 10 % 27 % 17 %*** 
 (N = 103) (N = 71) (2,97) 
    
Training  5 % 14 % 9 % 
 (N = 39) (N = 21) (1,22) 
    
No Training 13 % 25 % 12 %** 
 (N = 127) (N = 100) (2,24) 
    
Students    
Finance Major 24 % 31 % 7 % 
 (N = 72) (N = 36) (0,78) 
    
Other Major 15 % 21 % 6 % 
 (N = 73) (N = 29) (0,69) 
    
Own Experience 22 % 24 % 3 % 
 (N = 74) (N = 29) (0,28) 
    
No Own Experience 17 % 28 % 11 % 
 (N = 71) (N = 36) (1,32) 
   
Laypeople    
Own Experience 25 % 21 % -4 % 
 (N = 64) (N = 47) (-0,46) 
    
No Own Experience 23 % 26 % 3 % 
 (N = 53) (N = 31) (0,33) 
 
Statistical significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, ***  = 1% 
 
 
Further analysis on experience of the professionals reveals that ‘experienced’ (over five year 
work history) investment advisors are more exposed to sign of return effect than ‘inexperienced’ 
(five years or less). The ‘inexperienced’ investment advisors show a 4 percent difference between 
true and remembered success rates, which is not significant (z = 0.54). The respective difference 
for ‘experienced’ investment advisors 17 percent, which is highly significant (z = 2.97, p < 0.01). 
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This is opposite to what the hypothesis suggests and due to high significance does probably not 
result purely from coincidence. The logic behind this finding is unclear and requires further 
analysis. Unfortunately, the data of this study does not enable further analysis on this issue. 
The other expertise variable for investment advisors is training. Those professionals who 
have participated in a behavioral finance seminar (prior to the survey session), show a 9 percent 
difference between true and remembered success rates, which is not significant (z = 1.22). The 
respective difference for professionals who have not participated in such seminar is 12 percent 
which is significant at 5 percent significance level (z = 0.86). This supports the hypothesis that 
expertise reduces behavioral biases. 
In the student sample major of the respondent does not explain exposure to sign of return 
effect. Both finance and other major students show practically similar difference between true 
and remembered success rates. Neither of the differences is significant. Personal investment 
experience seems to explain the exposure to sign of return effect moderately. Students that have 
personal investment experience show a 3 percent difference, which is not significant (z = 0.28). 
Students who do not have personal investment experience show an 11 percent difference, which 
however is not significant (z = 1.32). As the differences are not significant, the support of these 
results to the hypothesis that expertise and experience reduce behavioral biases is only weak.  
The sub-profession results of the laypeople sample are weakly affected by personal 
investment experience. Respondents that have personal investment experience show a negative -4 
percent difference between true and remembered success rates. This difference is not statistically 
significant (z = -0.46). Respondents that do not have personal investment experience show a 3 
percent difference, which also is not significant (z = 0.33). Both differences are very close to zero 
and the interpretation of the negative difference is dubious. Thus the support of these results to 
the hypothesis that experience reduces behavioral biases is negligible.  
As the professionals sample is the most important part of this study and stock market return 
estimation task was the most interesting for the respondents a separate analysis for these results is 
done. Figure 5 shows the proportions of market movement estimates from the initial estimates 
and from the recollection. The results in figure 5 are comparable as for all professional groups the 
returns of both stock markets in this study were negative. 
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 Figure 5 – Hindsight bias, sign of return effect 
Initial vs. Recollected market movement estimate
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As can be seen from figure 5 only 11% of the professionals initially estimated a drop in share 
prices during the first return period. However, when recalled after the return period up to 31% of 
the professionals reported that they were able to predict the drop. Thus 20% of professionals 
remember that they estimated negative returns even though they actually estimated positive 
returns. This supports the hypothesis of hindsight bias strongly. The result is interesting; a part of 
investment advisors are unable to recognize that they were wrong in such a relevant issue for 
their profession as stock market return. This enhances their belief about their own capabilities and 
leads to personal overvaluation. This is very close to overconfidence and self-attribution bias. 
Investment advisors’ false perception of themselves as good stock market predictors affects also 
their clients. It is easier for the clients to be convinced on the talents of the professionals if they 
are confident on their selves. A confidently behaving investment advisor appears more talented, 
which can lead the client to take too big risks based on the advices of the professional. Taking 
major risks most likely has serious impact on an individual’s wealth. 
Another interesting observation that can be made from figure 5 is the level of optimism 
among investment advisors. The fact that the estimates were collected during the hardest 
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‘turbulence’ in financial markets for a several years backwards makes the collection of 
investment advisors’ optimism a valuable finding. Even in a situation that prevailed at the end of 
September 2008, financial market professionals report such high optimism. From the 
professionals 83% expected that the return of an emerging stock market (Russia or Brazil) would 
be positive during the next couple weeks. The realization turned out to be something else; the 
Russian shares dropped 45% and Brazilian 33%. Listening to an investment advisor can be 
hazardous to individual’s wealth. 
 
4.1.3. Drift of return 
Drift of return refers to an attribution of hindsight bias which suggests that people tend to 
adjust their initial return estimate closer to the realization after learning the outcome. People that 
have estimated higher returns than actually realize tend to underestimate their initial answer when 
asked after revealing the realization. Similarly people who have estimated lower returns than 
actually realize tend overestimate their initial answer after learning the outcome. Such people are 
exposed to hindsight bias. To discover the exposure of the sample in this study the answers to the 
return estimation tasks and their recollections are observed. The sample is divided on two based 
on the relation between initial answers and realized return. Table 9 shows the results of this test. 
Both initial and recollected versions of the return estimate are reported. The exposure to hindsight 
bias is observed on the difference between these two figures. To demonstrate the statistical 
significance a paired t-test is carried out. 
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Table 9 – Hindsight bias, drift of return effect 
 
Table 9 reports both initial and recollected versions of the return estimates. Hindsight bias is demonstrated as the 
difference between initial and recollected estimates (Recollection less Initial). The score of a paired t-test is 
reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Initial estimate higher than realized return 
 Return estimate  
 Initial Recollection Diff. 
Professionals 6,5% 4,8% -1,7%* 
 (N = 95) (-1,643) 
    
Students 7,6% 5,1% -2,5%** 
 (N = 48) (-2,174) 
    
Laypeople 9,3% 6,7% -2,6%*** 
  (N = 46)  (-2,682) 
    
Panel B: Initial estimate lower than realized return 
 Return estimate  
 Initial Recollection Diff. 
Professionals -4,8% 5,8% 10,5% 
 (N = 2) (1,105) 
    
Students -2,0% 3,8% 5,8%* 
 (N = 5) (1,985) 
    
Laypeople 5,2% 4,5% -0,7% 
  (N = 10)   (-0,349) 
 
Statistical significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, ***  = 1% 
 
 
The results in table 9 indicate that people suffer from hindsight bias. All respondent groups 
in panel A show statistically significant negative drift of return. This is line with the hypothesis 
of hindsight bias; people who have given too high estimates downgrade their perception about 
their initial estimate. For professionals the difference between initial and recollected return 
estimates  (drift)  is  1.7%,  which is  significant at 10 percent significance level (z = -1.643).  
Students show a -2.5% drift, which is significant at 5 percent significance level (z = -2.174). 
Finally laypeople show a -2.6% drift, which is highly significant (z = -2.682, p < 0.01). Also 
according to hindsight bias hypothesis, results in panel B are positive (or practically zero for 
laypeople). However the sample sizes are too small for any solid conclusions. 
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Similarly to sign of return analysis, the stock market estimates of investment advisor gain 
extra attention. To demonstrate hindsight bias the initial stock market return estimates and 
recolections of professionals’ are observed. The results are comparable as for all professional 
groups the returns of both stock markets in this study were negative. Figure 6 shows the 
distributions of initial return estimates and recollected versions of those. 
 
 Figure 6 – Hindsight bias, drift of return effect 
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Figure 6 shows that the distribution of initial answers has positive mean (+6.9%) and is 
relatively concentrated around the mean (standard deviation 7.7%). Distribution of recollected 
answers has mean of 2.4% and standard deviation of 13.0%. Comparison between the 
distributions reveals that the mean of the recollected distribution is lower and the difference 
statistically significant (t-stat 1.92). This supports the evidence that also investment advisors 
suffer from hindsight bias. There are also few outliers that support hindsight bias. In initial 
distribution observations on high returns (+35%) exist, but not in recollection. Moreover, in 
recollected distribution observations on low returns (-30%) exists even though the lowest 
observations in initial distribution are in -5% category. The impacts of the return drift effect on 
the advices of the investment advisors are similar to the impacts of sign of return effect. 
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Investment advisors’ false perceptions of stock market estimation abilities may cause their clients 
to take too large risks. 
 
4.1.4. Strength of view 
Another way to observe hindsight bias is to study how learning the outcome affects the 
perceived certainty in an estimation task. In the framework of this study this is done by asking the 
respondents to classify their initial confidence in selecting the better performing asset at phase 1 
and also recollecting their initial level of confidence at phase 2. The change between the initial 
and recollected confidence is studied. To demonstrate hindsight bias the sample is divided into 
two groups; the ones who believe they answered correctly and the ones who believe they 
answered incorrectly. According to hindsight bias people who believe they answered correctly 
may overestimate the initial certainty and people who believe they answered incorrectly may 
underestimate it. 
Table 10 presents initial and recolected average strength of view scores for each respondent 
group. The difference between panels A and B is that in panel A the sample is limited to answers 
where the respondent believed he/she had answered correctly whereas in panel B the sample is 
limited to answers where the respondent believed he/she had answered incorrectly. As described 
the logic in this is that the recollection may be affected by the realization of the result. The reason 
for using the believed answers is to eliminate the effect of falsely remembering own selection. 
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Table 10 – Hindsight bias, strength of view effect 
 
Table 10 reports both initial and recollected versions of the strength of view scores. Hindsight bias is measured as 
the difference between initial and recollected estimates (Recollection less Initial). The score of a paired t-test is 
reported in parentheses. The sample is divided on two panels, A and B. Panel A includes the answers in which 
case the respondent believes the answer to be correct. Panel B includes the answers in which case the respondent 
believes the answer to be correct. The reason for the separation is in the hypothesized direction of effect. 
 
Panel A: Asset selection believed correct 
 Strength of view  
 Initial Recollection Diff. 
Professionals 2,50 2,56 0,06 
 (N = 90) (0,52) 
    
Students 2,95 2,77 -0,18 
 (N = 56) (-1,15) 
    
Laypeople 2,11 2,13 0,02 
  (N = 47)  (0,12) 
    
Panel B: Asset selection believed incorrect 
 Strength of view  
 Initial Recollection Diff. 
Professionals 2,34 2,11 -0,23* 
 (N = 47) (-1,80) 
    
Students 2,55 2,26 -0,29** 
 (N = 42) (-2,14) 
    
Laypeople 2,39 1,79 -0,61*** 
  (N = 38)   (-4,07) 
Statistical significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, ***  = 1% 
 
 
As can be seen from Panel A people who find their initial selection to be correct do not show 
a clear tendency to overestimate the initial certainty. The results in Panel A are controversial; for 
professional and laypeople samples the recollected average strength of view is higher than the 
initial but for student sample it is lower than the initial. All of the differences are relatively close 
to zero and insignificant. Thus no strong conclusions can be made based on this sample. The 
evidence does not support the hypothesis that people who find themselves succeeding in a task 
increase their belief about their initial confidence in succeeding. 
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More interestingly  people who  find  their initial selection  to  be incorrect refuse to  
acknowledge how confident they actually were. Unlike in Panel A the results in Panel B are not 
controversial. All three subsamples show a negative change in strength of view. For professionals 
the difference is -0.23, which is significant at 10 percent significance level (t = -1.80). For 
Students the difference is -0.29, significant at 5 percent level (t = -2.14). For laypeople the 
difference is -0.61, which is highly significant (t = -4.07, p < 0.01). The results imply that people 
tend to underestimate the level of certainty they showed in first phase if their selection turns out 
to be wrong. They are not willing to face the unpleasant truth of being wrong. The failure is 
easier to accept if one thinks “I just guessed” rather than if “I made a real mistake”. 
 
4.2. Overconfidence 
Overconfidence is studied in two sets of tests. The first set of tests observes the ‘setting too 
narrow limits’ –effect by examining how the respondents estimate volatility. The second set of 
tests observes the relation between perceived confidence and actual ability to success in asset 
selection task. These techniques are discussed in more detail in section 3.2.2. 
In the first test the exposure to overconfidence is studied by comparing the average width of 
the 90% confidence bounds (spread) and the rate of success in bounds setting (hit%). Table 11 
presents the results of such comparison based on phase 1 answers and realized returns. 
 
Table 11 – Overconfidence, confidence boundaries 1/2 
Table 11 reports the average width of the 90% confidence bounds and the rate of success in bounds setting. The 
results are grouped based on asset and respondent group. The results are calculated for the answers of the first 
phase. 
 
Phase 1 results 
Professionals Laypeople Students 
Spread Hit % Spread Hit % Spread Hit % 
Stocks 21,1 % 2,0 % 9,3 % 0,0 % 29,1 % 50,0 % 
Currencies 7,2 % 26,0 % 7,4 % 12,0 % 17,9 % 35,0 % 
Commodities 15,1 % 17,3 % 8,4 % 25,0 % 20,2 % 20,0 % 
 
As the respondents were asked to set 90% confidence levels, rational answers should set the 
hit% close to 90%. The evidence from phase 1 is indisputable; none of the hit percentages is even 
close to 90%, the highest being 50%. However, the unique market condition which prevailed 
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during the tests must be kept in mind. For example a 45% drop in Russian stock market during 
about three weeks can surely be considered to belong to the unlikely 10%. Difference in market 
condition affects also the comparison of results between respondent groups. The returns during 
the professionals’ surveys were much more negative than during the student survey, which 
explains the difference in great deal. To reduce the effect of market condition a similar analysis is 
carried also with phase 2 answers. Table 12 shows the same figures as table 11 from phase 2.  
 
Table 12 – Overconfidence, confidence boundaries 1/2 
Table 12 reports the average width of the 90% confidence bounds and the rate of success in bounds setting. The 
results are grouped based on asset and respondent group. The results are calculated for the answers of the second 
phase. 
 
Phase 2 results 
Professionals Laypeople Students 
Spread Hit % Spread Hit % Spread Hit % 
Stocks 28,5 % 42,3 % 10,8 % 7,7 % 21,1 % 40,0 % 
Currencies 8,1 % 11,5 % 8,9 % 11,5 % 14,3 % 19,0 % 
Commodities 18,8 % 17,3 % 11,4 % 46,2 % 19,8 % 14,3 % 
 
The results in table 12 are similar to table 11. The level of hit% has increased, but is stil not 
close to 90%. A slight increase in average spread can be seen, which indicates learning. However, 
the change in spread is relative smal for professionals and laypeople, for students it is negative. 
For this reason the increase results probably more from normalization of market conditions than 
from improved spread estimates. These results raise the question whether the low levels of hit% 
result from  poor volatility estimation or from  abnormal market condition.  To answer this  
question, a more in-depth comparison test of volatility estimation is carried out. 
In the volatility comparison test the spreads colected from the respondents are converted 
into volatility estimates. These converted volatility estimates are compared to different 
volatilities. This test uses a simplifying method of averaging volatilities, which is described in 
more detail in section 3.2.2. The comparison of includes seven different averaged volatility 
figures for each asset. These figures include two respondent estimates of volatility (return periods 
1 and 2), one recollection (return period 1) and four actual volatilities for comparison purposes 
(return periods 1 and 2, 100 days prior to survey and long-term average). Table 13 presents the 
results of this comparison test. 
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Table 13 – Overconfidence, volatility estimation 
Table 13 reports volatility estimates, recollections and actual volatilities from different phases of this study. The 
reported volatilities are segmented by asset (in panels A, B and C), respondent group and description. The 
descriptions used are: ‘Normal’ that refers to average long term volatility, ‘100d before’ that refers to the volatility 
calculated on a 100 days period prior to the surveys, ‘Estimated 1’ that refers to the respondents’ estimate at phase 
1, ‘Realized 1’ is realized volatility at phase 1, ‘Recollected 1’ is the recollection of ‘Estimate 1’, ‘Estimate 2’ the 
phase 2 estimate, and ‘Realized 2’ realized volatility at phase 2 
 
Panel A: Stocks 
 ‘Normal’ 
100d 
before 
Estimated 
1 
Realized 
1 
Recollected 
1 
Estimated 
2 
Realized 
2 
        
Professionals 47% 53% 21% 132% 25% 25% 75% 
        
Students 47% 73% 34% 118% 20% 15% 69% 
        
Laypeople 47% 83% 10% 98% 11% 12% 61% 
         
Panel B: Currencies 
 ‘Normal’ 
100d 
before 
Estimated 
1 
Realized 
1 
Recollected 
1 
Estimated 
2 
Realized 
2 
        
Professionals 7% 6% 7% 13% 9% 7% 18% 
        
Students 7% 7% 19% 13% 15% 11% 18% 
        
Laypeople 7% 8% 8% 16% 11% 9% 19% 
         
 
Panel C: Commodities 
 ‘Normal’ 
100d 
before 
Estimated 
1 
Realized 
1 
Recollected 
1 
Estimated 
2 
Realized 
2 
        
Professionals 24% 36% 15% 56% 18% 16% 59% 
        
Students 24% 41% 23% 59% 17% 16% 63% 
        
Laypeople 24% 43% 10% 62% 11% 12% 62% 
         
 
As can be seen from table 13 estimated volatilities are generally lower than actual 
volatilities. For certain combinations of asset and respondent group the gap between estimated 
and realized volatility is wide. Professionals, who most likely are most involved with volatility in 
real life, underestimate the volatilities of stocks and commodities compared to the ‘normal’ 
volatilities. Only with currency return estimates professionals estimate volatility close to the 
‘normal’ volatility. The results of the professionals’ support overconfidence and the ‘setting too 
narrow confidence limits’ effect. The fact that volatilities prior to the surveys (‘100d before’) 
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were above their normal level strengthens the support of volatility underestimation of 
professionals. Even though professionals are aware of increased volatility, they are unable to give 
realistic volatility estimates compared even to normal, not prevailing, volatility.  
Volatility learning of professionals is almost negligible. After learning the realized volatility, 
and the insufficiency of their phase 1 estimates, professionals generally do not increase their 
estimated volatility, and may in fact lower it (‘Estimated 2’ is compared to ‘Recollected 1’ to 
exclude possible effect of hindsight bias). Results in tables 11 and 12 show that professionals 
increase their spread estimated from phase 1 to phase 2 by a small margin. However, they are 
unable to recognize the increased length of estimation period (see table 1) and thus the estimated 
volatilities remain at same or even at lower level. Professionals also have a slight tendency to 
overestimate their initial volatility estimates at the recollection (‘Estimated 1’ compared to 
‘Recollected 1’). This is interpreted to be in line with the hypothesis of hindsight bias as the 
estimated volatilities were too low compared to the realized ones. 
Although underestimating volatility professionals are still able to adjust their volatility 
estimates based on the asset. This separates them from the other respondents. The volatility 
estimates of students at phase 1 are relatively high for all assets. This is rational for stocks and 
commodities but not for currencies. The fact that al volatility estimates of students are relatively 
high indicates that students have apprehended that volatility estimates ought to be high but are 
not able to indentify normal volatilities of separate assets. The adjustment of volatility of students 
between phase 1 and phase 2 is irrational. Students lower their volatility estimates from phase 1 
to phase 2, even though the phase 1 estimates were generally insufficient. In other words, the 
somewhat realistic estimates  of phase 1  are not carried along to phase 2  and thus  phase 2  
estimates of students are underestimated. Conversely to professionals, students underestimate 
their initial volatility estimates at the recollection. This is opposite to the hypothesis of hindsight 
bias. Overall, results of the student sample do not make much sense. This might indicate that 
students actually are not very familiar with volatility and thus behave in an inconsistent manor 
with volatility. 
Laypeople systematically report too low volatility estimates and are also poor to adjust their 
estimates based on asset. Even though volatility underestimation is usually considered to indicate 
overconfidence, this might not be the case here. Majority of the laypeople in this study are not 
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very familiar with volatility and confidence boundaries. Thus it is likely that their too low 
volatility estimates result from poor understanding rather than overconfidence. Despite of this, 
the finding that laypeople underestimate volatility is valuable. Underestimation of volatility leads 
to poor investment decision regardless of the source of it. Learning of laypeople is negligible; the 
is practically no difference between believed initial (i.e. recollected) phase 1 and phase 2 
estimates. Also the difference between true initial and recollected estimates is almost nonexistent. 
These observations support the explanation that most laypeople do not understand volatility and 
confidence boundaries very well and thus are unable to process questions including those.5 
The overall conclusion on the results of table 13 is that people in general are unable to give 
realistic volatility estimates by setting 90% confidence boundaries. The estimates given are 
systematically too low. Learning of volatility is also weak; after learning the insufficiency of their 
prior estimates, people tend to increase their estimates, but almost invariably not enough. The 
results also imply that the professionals are the only that truly understand volatility; students and 
laypeople (as a group) report such results that indicate poor knowledge on volatility. Results in 
table 12 are in line with the results in tables 11 and 12. 
Also for volatility estimation analysis, the professionals’ stock market estimates are 
highlighted. The ability of investment advisors to estimate volatility is studied by comparing their 
estimated volatilities with realized ones. This analysis uses a similar structure than table 13, but 
presents the results in a graphic form. 
 
                                                  
5
 The intuition of the author is in line with this. 
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 Figure 7 – Overconfidence, volatility estimation 
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Results in figure 7 are in line with the results in table 13; investment advisors underestimate 
volatility by a wide margin. The estimated volatility for return period 1 is significantly lower than 
‘normal’ or prevailing (100d before) volatility. Volatility learning is also poor; estimated 
volatility for return period 2 is equal to the respondents’ perceived period 1 volatility (i.e. 
recollected). The difference between the initial and recollected volatility is slightly positive, 
which is line with the hypothesis of hindsight bias.  
W hen interpreting the results of figure 7, it should be noticed that the ‘normal’ refers to the 
average volatilities of Brazilian and Russian stock market. The ‘normal’ annual long term 
volatility of U.S. stock market is significantly lower, about 15%6. It might be that investment 
advisors are simply unable to devolve the information that emerging markets are riskier than 
developed markets, which they surely agree on, to their volatility estimates. Even so, the finding 
that investment advisors underestimate volatility and are unable to learn is valuable. The fact that 
it holds also for stock market estimates affects the quality of investment advisors’ advices to their 
customers. As even the professionals are not able to assess risk in proper way, it is almost 
impossible for the clients who have faith in the abilities of their advisors. The fact that investment 
advisor are unaware of their tendency to underestimate volatility prevents them from controlling 
                                                  
6
 Dow Jones Industrials Average Price Index between 2.1.1951 and 6.8.2009 
60 
their advices. As a result, clients of investment advisors are not able to realize the prevailing risks 
of their investments and take too much risk compared to their true risk profile. 
The second aspect of overconfidence studied is the relation between confidence and 
performance. To measure overconfidence the average strength of view score and the percentage 
of successful answers are reported. To compare overconfidence between groups, the results are 
grouped based on background information. According to the hypothesis of overconfidence the 
groups with high strength of view score relative to success% suffer from overconfidence. These 
respondents have overestimated their confidence of selecting the better performing asset 
compared to their true ability to do that. Table 14 shows the results of this comparison test. 
 
 Table 14 – Overconfidence, confidence-performance 1/3 
Group 
Strength 
of view 
Success% 
Investment advisor 2,44 63 % 
Investment advisor, women 2,40 70 % 
Investment advisor, men 2,54 53 % 
Investment advisor, <=5 exp 2,27 65 % 
Investment advisor, >5 exp 2,55 62 % 
Investment advisor, training 2,28 69 % 
Investment advisor, no training 2,49 61 % 
Laypeople 2,12 45 % 
Laypeople, women 1,99 37 % 
Laypeople, men 2,30 55 % 
Laypeople, commercial 2,15 41 % 
Laypeople, technical 2,14 42 % 
Student 2,92 44 % 
Student, women 2,83 39 % 
Student, men 2,96 46 % 
Student, finance major 2,75 50 % 
Student, other major 3,03 40 % 
W omen 2,38 50 % 
Men 2,73 49 % 
NFC Q1 2,50 47 % 
NFC Q2 2,61 60 % 
NFC Q3 2,49 47 % 
NFC Q4 2,68 45 % 
FI Q1 2,37 53 % 
FI Q2 2,85 49 % 
FI Q3 2,43 48 % 
FI Q4 2,73 46 % 
All 2,56 49 % 
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As can be seen from table 14, there are significant differences between respondent groups 
both in strength of view and success. In this simplified analysis overconfidence is measured by 
the relation of confidence (strength of view) and success. Combination of high confidence and 
low success indicates overconfidence. The group with highest degree of overconfidence with this 
measure is students with a major other than finance (3.03 / 40%). The lowest degree is on 
investment advisors who have participated in behavioral finance training before (2.28 / 61%). In 
order to find out the relation between confidence and performance, the individual groups of table 
14 are charted on a two dimensional graph with success rate on y-axis and strength of view on x-
axis. To demonstrate the relation a regression slope is also drawn. Figure 8 shows the results. 
 
 Figure 8 – overconfidence, confidence-performance 1/2 
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The fact that there seems to be negative correlation between strength of view and success 
rate, for grouped results at least, implies strong overconfidence. A reliable observation that 
people who are more confident are more prone to fail would be highly valuable. As the results in 
figure 7 are for groups of people, it does not necessarily mean that the correlation of confidence 
and success for individual people would be negative. The results in figure 8 may also indicate 
that certain groups on average are more overconfident than others. Even so, it is a valuable 
finding to discover which groups of people are more overconfident than others. The fact that 
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results in figure 8 allow the possibility that confidence might be negatively correlated with 
success, calls for more analysis on the relation of confidence and success rate. For this purpose 
the sample of asset selection answers is divided into five subgroups based on the announced 
strength of view. The performance of each subgroup is then studied. Table 15 shows the rate of 
correct answers grouped by the strength of view. Figure 9 shows the same information than table 
15 in graphical form. 
 
 Table 15 – Overconfidence, confidence-performance 2/3 
Table 15 reports the proportion of correct answers within the sample in question. The sample is divided 
based on the reported strength of view score (1-5).  The results are reported for the whole sample (‘All’) as 
well as for separate respondent groups. Figures in parentheses are the numbers of answers, n 
 
Strength of view Professionals Laypeople Students All 
1   59%  (78)  40%  (95) 43%   (83) 47%  (256) 
2   57%  (87)  52%  (91) 50%   (70) 53%  (248) 
3   55%  (83)  56%  (43) 56%   (77) 56%  (203) 
4   73%  (67)  34%  (29)  57%  (105) 59%  (201) 
5 100%  (4) 75%   (4) 35%   (26) 47%   (34) 
 
Figure 9 – overconfidence, confidence-performance 2/2 
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The results in table 15 and figure 9 are somewhat incoherent; there is no clear relation 
between strength of view and success rate. For all respondents the correlation between 
confidence and success rate there seems to be positive between strength of view score one to 
four. People that have been the most confident, strength of view score five, have equally low 
success rate than people with the lowest confidence, strength of view score one. Thus the shape 
of the ‘confidence-success curve’ seems to be concave. However, there are differences between 
respondent groups in the shape of the curve. For students the shape is similar to the all 
respondents’ curve. Also the shape of the laypeople curve is similar to the all respondents’ curve 
but with the exception that success decreases already at strength of view score four. Laypeople 
with strength of view score five are not included in the analysis due to the low n (4). For 
professionals the shape of the ‘confidence-success curve’ is opposite to the other groups; it seems 
to be convex. Success of professionals slightly decreases from strength of view score one to three 
but increases strongly in strength of view score four (and five). Strength of view score five is 
however not included in the analysis due to the low n (4). The differences between respondent 
groups imply that the relation of confidence and performance might be unequal for different 
groups of people. 
As the results in table 15 and figure 9 do not offer reliable general explanation on the relation 
of confidence and performance more analysis is required. In order to discover the true relation 
between confidence and performance a more sophisticated test is carried out. Table 16 shows the 
results of the logit-regression described in section 3.2.2. The purpose of the regression is to 
forecast success in picking the better performing asset. Main interest in the regression is to study 
the effect of confidence (strength of view score) on performance. A negative impact on the 
probability to succeed would be a strong sign of overconfidence. Also the independency of 
success from strength of view is interpreted as overconfidence. In addition to the full sample 
regression, each respondent group is studied separately to observe the possibly different relation 
of confidence and performance. 
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Table 16 – Overconfidence, confidence-performance 3/3 
Table 16 reports the results from the logit-regression. The regression uses the binary variable of success as the 
response variable. The explanatory variables are based on the collected background data and are different for each 
sample. Marking (d) after the name of a variable means that the variable is a dummy. The table is divided into 
four panels, each for separate sample. Panel A reports the results of the ful sample, panel B of professional 
sample, panel C of student sample and panel D of laypeople sample. ‘Estimate’ refers to the estimate of 
maximum likelihood, and ‘Pr > ChiSq’ to the statistical significance of the estimate. 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
 Estimate  W ald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Strength of View 0,12 4,61 0,03** 
Faith in Intuition -0,03 1,33 0,25 
Need for Cognition -0,01 0,06 0,80 
Male (d) -0,10 0,51 0,48 
Professional (d) 0,46 7,80 <0,01*** 
Laypeople (d) -0,08 0,20 0,65 
Panel B: Professionals 
 Estimate W ald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Strength of View 0,24 4,52 0,03** 
Faith in Intuition -0,05 1,24 0,27 
Need for Cognition 0,01 0,02 0,89 
Experience 0,00 0,02 0,88 
Male (d) -0,90 10,94 <0,01*** 
Training (d) 0,14 0,24 0,62 
Panel C: Students 
 Estimate W ald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Strength of View 0,07 0,59 0,44 
Faith in Intuition -0,04 0,90 0,34 
Need for Cognition 0,02 0,32 0,57 
Male (d) 0,09 0,13 0,71 
Investment experience (d) 0,31 1,85 0,17 
Finance major (d) 0,05 0,04 0,83 
Panel D: Laypeople 
 Estimate W ald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Strength of View 0,10 0,52 0,47 
Faith in Intuition -0,03 0,40 0,52 
Need for Cognition -0,01 0,05 0,83 
Male (d) 0,34 1,68 0,19 
Investment experience (d) 0,14 0,27 0,60 
Believed expertise -0,11 0,33 0,56 
 
Statistical significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, ***  = 1% 
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Despite the findings in earlier sections of this study, there seems to be positive correlation 
between confidence and performance. Individual people that are more confident are more likely 
to succeed. In the whole sample regression an increase in the strength of view score increases the 
probability of success ( = 0.12). The increase is significant at five percent significance level (w 
= 4.61). Another significant variable affecting the probability of success is the professional 
dummy variable; being a professional increases the probability of success ( = 0.46). The 
increase is highly significant (w = 7.80, p < 0.01). This implies that professionals outperform 
other people in financial market related winner selection tasks. The impact of faith in intuition 
(FI) score on success seems to be negative; increase in FI-score decreases the probability of 
success ( = -0.03). The decrease, however, is not significant (w = 1.33). 
In the sub-sample regressions strength of view has a positive impact on the probability of 
success for all respondent groups. The impact for professionals is highest ( = 0.24), significant 
at the five percent significance level (w = 4.52). For students ( = 0.07) and for laypeople ( = 
0.10), the impact is lower, neither being significant. This implies that the effect of confidence in 
success is higher for professionals than other people. Thus investment advisors seem to be less 
overconfident that other people.  
In addition to strength of view there was only a few other factors affecting the probability of 
success that have any explanatory power. The most important of these factors is gender of a 
professional; being a male investment advisor decreases the probability of success compared to 
the female colleagues ( = -0.90). The difference is highly significant (w = 10.94, p < 0.01). 
Gender plays role for laypeople also, but on the opposite direction. Male laypeople have higher 
probability to succeed ( = 0.34), the difference however is not significant (w = 1.68). For 
students, personal investment experience has a positive impact on success. Students that have 
made personal stock market investments have higher probability of success than students that 
have not made such investments ( = 0.31). The difference is not significant (w = 1.87). 
Even though the relation between confidence and performance seems to be positive, factors 
affecting confidence are important. An increase in confidence for some variable might indicate 
overconfidence. This holds if the same variable decreases probability of success (table 16). To 
further investigate overconfidence an ordinary least square regression explaining strength of view 
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is conducted. The purpose of the regression is to discover factors affecting confidence. Table 17 
shows the results of the regression. The results are compared to the results of table 16. 
 
Table 17 – overconfidence, confidence 
Table 17 reports the results from the OLS-regression. The regression uses the strength of view  score as  the 
response (dependent) variable for confidence. The used explanatory (independent) variables are gender, 
profession and the thinking style scores NFC and FI. The significance of the results is demonstrated using 
standard t-test.. Marking (d) after the name of a variable means that the variable is a dummy. ‘Estimate’ refers to 
the estimate of regression coefficient, and ‘Pr > t-stat’ to the statistical significance of the estimate. 
 
 Estimate ! t-stat Pr > t-stat 
Faith in Intuition 0,06 3,54 <0,01*** 
Need for Cognition 0,00 0,12 0,91 
Male (d) 0,24 2,29 0,02** 
Professional (d) -0,40 -3,31 <0,01*** 
Laypeople (d) -0,79 -6,39 <0,01*** 
 
Statistical significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, ***  = 1% 
 
Results in table 17 show that several variables have significant impact on confidence. Higher 
faith in intuition (FI-score) increases confidence (! = 0.06). The increase is highly significant, (t 
= 3.54, p < 0.01). This combined with the fact that the impact of FI-score on success is negative, 
although not significant (table 16), indicates that people with high FI-score are overconfident. As 
the effect of analytical thinking is not significant either for confidence or success, no conclusion 
on that can be made. Males report higher confidence than woman (! = 0.24), the difference is 
also significant at 5 percent significance level (t = 2.29). In addition men report lower success 
than women, which indicates that men are more overconfident than women. However, the 
success variable (in table 16) is not significant, and thus no strong conclusions can be made. 
The impact of the professional dummy variable on confidence is strong (! = -0.40). 
Professionals are less confident than the base group, students. The difference is highly significant 
(t = -3.31, p < 0.01). Moreover, the impact of the professional dummy on success is strong ( = 
0.46) and highly significant (w = 7.80, p < 0.01). This indicates strongly that the difference is 
overconfidence between professionals and students is wide. Professionals are much less 
overconfident than students. The effect of the laypeople dummy on confidence is also strong (! = 
-0.79) and highly significant (t = -6.39, p < 0.01). Laypeople are less confident than students. The 
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effect of laypeople dummy on success is slightly negative ( = -0.08), but not significant. Thus 
the results indicate that laypeople are less overconfident than students. The difference, however, 
is not as significant as between professionals and students. 
 
4.3. Self-attribution bias 
Self-attribution bias is studied in two tests. Both tests measure self-attribution bias by the 
change in perceived certainty of success between first and second rounds. The difference is in the 
determination of success. First test uses individual answers whereas second test uses pooled 
answers for a single person. The techniques used are discussed in more detail in section 3.2.3. 
The first test bases on an attribution of self-attribution bias according to which people who 
believe they have succeeded in a winner selection task attribute themselves on the success. As a 
result of this, such people overestimate their own capability and become more confident. 
Similarly people who believe they failed in a winner selection task attribute themselves on the 
failure and become less confident. To demonstrate self-attribution bias the sample of asset 
selection answers of this study is divided into two sub-samples based on the believed correctness. 
Self-attribution bias is measured by the change in strength of view score between the rounds. 
Table 18 presents the results. To demonstrate the statistical significance a paired t-test is carried. 
 
Table 18 – Self-attribution bias, individual answers test 
Table 18 reports both the recollected phase 1 and phase 2 strength of view scores. Self-attribution bias is 
measured by the difference between these (Phase 2 less Phase 1). The score of a paired t-test is reported in 
parentheses. The sample is divided on two panels, A and B. Panel A includes the answers in which case the 
respondent believes the answer to be correct. Panel B includes the answers in which case the respondent believes 
the answer to be correct. The reason for the separation is in the hypothesized direction of effect. 
  
Panel A: Asset selection believed correct 
 Strength of view  
 Phase 1 (recollection) Phase 2 Diff. 
Professionals 2,50 2,68 0,18* 
 (N = 90) (1,666) 
    
Students 2,74 2,80 0,06 
 (N = 50) (0,401) 
    
Laypeople 2,09 2,14 0,05 
  (N = 44)  (0,443) 
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Panel B: Asset selection believed incorrect 
 Strength of view  
 Phase 1 (recollection) Phase 2 Diff. 
Professionals 2,07 2,11 0,04 
 (N = 45) (0,350) 
    
Students 2,21 2,10 -0,10 
 (N = 39) (-1,071) 
    
Laypeople 1,90 1,90 - 
  (N = 39)   (-) 
 
Statistical significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, ***  = 1% 
 
Results in table 18 indicate that people suffer from self-attribution bias. People who believe 
they have succeeded do increase their confidence after learning the outcome. This holds 
especially for professionals, who show a 0.18 points increase in strength of view (measured on 
scale 1 to 5). The difference is statistically significant at ten percent significance level (t = 1.67). 
Also students and laypeople show an increase in confidence but these differences are not 
significant at the ten percent significance level. Overall results in panel A are in line with the 
hypothesis. These results also suggest that professionals suffer the most of self-attribution bias, 
which is against the hypothesis that expertise reduces behavioral biases. 
The other test of self-attribution bias uses the overall success of a respondent. The test is 
based on an attribution of self-attribution bias that people who have successful in the past 
attribute themselves on success. As a result successful people overestimate their own capability 
and become more confident. To observe hindsight bias the sample is divided into four sub-
samples based on the perceived number of correct answers at phase 1. The change in strength of 
view is studied. Table 19 presents the results. To demonstrate the statistical significance a paired 
t-test is carried. Figure 10 shows the same information as table 19 but in graphical form. 
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Table 19 – Self-attribution bias, person level test  
Table 17 reports both the recollected phase 1 and phase 2 strength of view scores. Self-attribution bias is 
measured by the difference between these (Phase 2 less Phase 1). The score of a paired t-test is reported in 
parentheses. The sample is divided by the perceived number of correct answers at phase 1. The reason for the 
separation is in the hypothesized direction of effect. 
  
 Strength of view  
 Phase 1 (recollection) Phase 2 Diff. 
No. of Correct Answers = 0 1,67 1,89 0,22 
 (N = 3) (1,000) 
    
No. of Correct Answers = 1 2,26 2,06 -0,19* 
 (N = 31) (-1,871) 
    
No. of Correct Answers = 2 2,28 2,47 0,19* 
  (N = 40)  (1,831) 
    
No. of Correct Answers = 3 2,62 2,82 0,20 
 (N = 15) (0,731) 
 
Statistical significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, ***  = 1% 
 
 
 
 Figure 10 – Self-attribution bias, person level test 
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The results in table 19 and figure 10 imply that people suffer from self-attribution bias. 
Similarly to the analysis of hindsight bias (see figure 4) there seems to be a verge of good and 
bad result between one and two correct answers. Reflecting to this the changes in confidence are 
in line with the hypothesis for all sub-samples, besides zero correct answers. Moreover, the n for 
zero correct answers is too small (3) for any reliable analysis. People who believe they had only 
one correct answer decrease their strength of view score by 0.19. The decrease is significant at 
ten percent significance level (t = -1.87). Likewise, people who believe they have two correct 
answers  increase their strength of view  by 0.19,  which is  also significant at ten percent 
significance level (t = 1.83). People who believe they have all three correct, increase their 
strength of view by 0.20. This increase, however, is not significant (t = 0.73). Overall, the results 
in table 19 and figure 10 support the existence of self-attribution bias; people who are successful 
in the past become more confident. 
 
4.4. Cognitive-experiential self-theory 
The last section of the results section discusses the answers collected in the rational-
experiential inventory. The main reason to include a test of individual thinking in the survey was 
to provide explanatory data for the tests of behavioral biases. However, the results of the rational-
experiential inventory are interesting per se. The purpose here is to compare individual thinking 
styles of the different respondent groups of this study. For this purpose the sample is divided into 
several sub-samples based on the background variables collected in the surveys. Table 20 
presents the average scores of the rational-experimental test. Need for Cognition (NFC) refers to 
the level of analytical thinking (higher NFC  score,  more analytical way to think).  Faith in 
Intuition (FI) naturally refers to the faith in intuition (higher FI score, more faith that own 
intuition is correct). 
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 Table 20 – Individual thinking 
Group NFC FI n 
Investment advisor 3,16 2,79 56 
Investment advisor, women 2,57 3,43 35 
Investment advisor, men 4,30 1,70 20 
Laypeople 4,11 3,87 53 
Laypeople, women 3,81 3,77 31 
Laypeople, men 4,38 3,95 21 
Laypeople, commercial 3,82 4,05 22 
Laypeople, technical 4,25 3,75 20 
Student 3,75 2,53 89 
Student, women 3,29 2,79 28 
Student, men 3,97 2,41 61 
Student, finance major 4,71 1,86 35 
Student, other major 3,13 2,96 54 
W omen 3,19 3,35 94 
Men 4,12 2,59 102 
All 3,68 2,96 198 
 
As can be seen from table 20, there are significant differences between respondent groups in 
individual thinking. Probably the most interesting finding is that investment advisors on average 
are the least analytical people of the sample. However, there is a severe gender effect in 
analytical thinking of the professionals; male professionals rank third of all subgroups whereas 
female professionals rank last. Overall men are more analytical than woman but the difference for 
other respondent groups is not as strong. W ithin the student sample, major of the respondent 
seems to affect analytical thinking strongly. Finance students are the most analytical subgroup 
whereas students with other major rank second last in analytical thinking. M ale students are 
somewhat more analytical than female students. Differences within the laypeople sample are not 
as strong as within professional and student samples. Men seem to be more analytical than 
women and people with technical education seem to be more analytical than people with 
commercial education.  
Differences in faith in intuition are generally in line with the analytical thinking results and 
thus with the hypothesis. People that have high analytical thinking are expected to have low faith 
in intuition. This hypothesis holds for professionals and students but not for laypeople. Laypeople 
report high scores both in analytical thinking and faith in intuition. A two dimensional graph 
(Figure 11) demonstrate this effect; faith in intuition is in y-axis and analytical thinking in x-axis.  
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 Figure 11 – Individual thinking 
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Figure 11 clearly shows the incoherence of laypeople thinking measures compared to other 
people. Laypeople report higher faith in intuition scores than any other subgroup even though this 
is not justified with low analytical thinking. One possible explanation for the effect could link to 
overconfidence. The questions in the rational-experiential inventory are composed in a way that 
if a respondent for some reason believes that performance is measured based on those answers, 
he/she might overestimate own performance by skewing own answers towards the perceived 
good performance. An example is better to clarify this logic; in the question of statement: “M y 
initial impressions of people are almost always right”, it is relatively easy to mentally connect 
good performance to a high score. Thus overconfident people, that believe to be good performers, 
tend to report high scores. The statements measuring faith in intuition, like the one above, could 
follow this logic. However, tests of overconfidence in this study do not support this; laypeople 
are generally not reported to have the highest degree of overconfidence. For this reason no strong 
conclusions about the high faith in intuition of laypeople can be made.  
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5. Conclusions 
This section summarizes the empirical study of this thesis and concludes the results. In 
addition, this section discusses the implications of the results. The purpose of the thesis is to 
study three behavioral biases; hindsight bias, overconfidence, and self-attribution bias. To study 
these biases an empirical study is carried out. The purpose of the empirical study is to answer the 
following research questions: 
 
1. How does the hindsight bias affect the ex-post conception of the ex-ante expectation? 
  Do investment advisors suffer from hindsight bias? 
  Does expertise reduce the hindsight bias? 
  W hat characteristics affect the severity of hindsight bias? 
 
2. How does the overconfidence affect the setting of confidence limits? 
  Do investment advisors set too narrow confidence limits? 
  Does expertise reduce overconfidence? 
  W hat characteristics affect the severity of overconfidence? 
 
3. How does the self-attribution bias affect confidence in repeated tasks? 
  Do investment advisors adjust their confidence based on the results? 
  Does expertise reduce the self-attribution bias? 
  W hat characteristics affect the severity of self-attribution bias? 
 
The empirical study of this thesis uses a controlled field survey to collect data for the tests. 
The survey is carried for three separate groups of people; financial professionals, university 
students and employees of an engineering company. The structure of the survey is two-phased, 
which enables studying the three biases. The biases are studied by comparing observations from 
different phases of the surveys to each other. Hindsight bias is observed by differences between 
initial answers and the recollections. Overconfidence is studied using initial answers and realized 
results. Analyses of self-attribution bias use initial answers from first and second round. 
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The results on hindsight bias suggest that all people, including investment advisors, suffer 
from it. People tend to perceive their initial performance better than it actually is, after learning 
the outcome. The tests of this study show that people tend to overestimate their initial capability 
to choose the better performing asset from two alternatives or estimate the return of an asset, after 
learning the realization. People tend to underestimate their initial confidence if they find out they 
have been unsuccessful. Investment advisors are in general less exposed to hindsight bias than 
other people. Thus expertise is interpreted to reduce hindsight bias. However, investment 
advisors have the strongest tendency to exaggerate their initial ability to predict asset returns, 
after learning the realization. The exaggeration reinforces with experience. 
The results on overconfidence imply that people are overconfident. The evidence on the 
‘setting too narrow limits’ effect is strong. All respondent groups on average report much lower 
success percentages than the required confidence boundaries. This indicates overconfidence. 
Moreover, the results imply that people systematically underestimate volatility and the learning 
of volatility is poor. The differences on overconfidence are significant between groups of people. 
In general people with more expertise are less confident compared to their true capabilities. 
Professionals outperform other people with lower level of confidence, which indicates lower 
overconfidence. 
The results on self-attribution bias indicate that people suffer from it. People who believe 
they have been successful in a task on initial round increase their confidence to the second round. 
Thus they attribute their selves on the success, which is in line with self-attribution bias. Opposite 
to the hypothesis that expertise reduces behavioral biases, investment advisors are the most 
exposed to self-attribution bias. 
The results of individual thinking style indicate that certain characteristics affect the 
exposure to behavioral biases. The results show that people with high faith in intuition are in 
general more exposed to behavioral biases. However, people with high level of analytical 
thinking are not less exposed. This is against the hypothesis that people with high cognitive 
abilities are less exposed. The analytical thinking and faith in intuition scores of the professional 
are generally relatively close to whole sample averages. However, there is significant difference 
in thinking styles between male and female investment advisors. Female professionals have high 
faith in intuition and low analytical thinking. Male professionals on the contrary have low faith in 
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intuition and high analytical thinking. The gender effect for the professionals is stronger than for 
other people. 
The exposure to any of the studied biases alone deteriorates decision making. However, the 
biases are not independent to each other. The exposure to either hindsight or self-attribution bias 
is likely to increase overconfidence. This results from the hindering of learning both these biases 
cause. Moreover, hindsight and self-attribution bias also reinforce each other. Thus the joint 
impact of hindsight and self-attribution bias on overconfidence is strong. Firstly, hindsight bias 
leads people to perceive their behavior as optimal and secondly self-attribution bias excessively 
enforces their confidence due to the perception of optimal behavior. As a result, people that have 
actually performed poorly become overconfident as they falsely attribute themselves on good 
performance. The fact that both hindsight bias and self-attribution bias lead to overconfidence has 
serious impacts on the financial decisions of clients depending on the advices of investment 
advisors. As investment advisors are exposed to these biases, their advices for their clients are not 
optimal. As a result, their clients end up making decisions that might be hazardous to their 
wealth. However, knowledge about behavioral biases seems to reduce investment advisors biases. 
This highlights the importance of training. 
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7. Exhibits 
7.1. Distributions of thinking style scores 
This section includes the distributions of the individual thinking style scores, NFC and FI. 
 
Distribution of Need for Cognition Score
0 %
2 %
4 %
6 %
8 %
10 %
12 %
14 %
16 %
18 %
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Distribution Normal distrbution
 
Distribution of Faith in Intuition Score
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7.2. Regression statistics 
This section includes the statistics of the regressions on this thesis. 
7.2.1. Logit-regression, full sample 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept 
Only 
Intercept 
and 
Covariates 
AIC 1284.599 1276.241 
SC 1289.432 1310.072 
-2 Log L 1282.599 1262.241 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter DF Estimate Standard 
Error 
W ald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -0.1537 0.2241 0.4705 0.4928 
Strenght of view 1 0.1248 0.0581 4.6125 0.0317 
NFC 1 -0.00577 0.0227 0.0644 0.7997 
FI 1 -0.0291 0.0252 1.3297 0.2489 
Male 1 -0.1031 0.1444 0.5104 0.4750 
Professional 1 0.4613 0.1652 7.7984 0.0052 
Laypeople 1 -0.0803 0.1783 0.2027 0.6526 
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7.2.2. Logit-regression, professionals sample 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept 
Only 
Intercept 
and 
Covariates 
AIC 418.727 414.703 
SC 422.473 440.926 
-2 Log L 416.727 400.703 
 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter DF Estimate Standard 
Error 
W ald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 0.3586 0.4004 0.8021 0.3705 
Male 1 -0.9011 0.2724 10.9443 0.0009 
Strength of view 1 0.2397 0.1126 4.5291 0.0333 
Experience 1 -0.00252 0.0170 0.0219 0.8823 
Training 1 0.1442 0.2930 0.2421 0.6227 
NFC 1 0.00608 0.0428 0.0202 0.8870 
FI 1 -0.0527 0.0474 1.2368 0.2661 
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7.2.3. Logit-regression, students sample 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept 
Only 
Intercept 
and 
Covariates 
AIC 500.966 507.994 
SC 504.852 535.196 
-2 Log L 498.966 493.994 
  
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter DF Estimate Standard 
Error 
W ald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -0.3853 0.3234 1.4192 0.2335 
Strength of view 1 0.0663 0.0865 0.5886 0.4430 
Finance m ajor 1 0.0485 0.2366 0.0420 0.8377 
Male 1 0.0933 0.2544 0.1343 0.7140 
Inv. Experience 1 0.3082 0.2268 1.8474 0.1741 
NFC 1 0.0219 0.0388 0.3173 0.5732 
FI 1 -0.0370 0.0390 0.9017 0.3423 
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7.2.4. Logit-regression, laypeople sample 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept 
Only 
Intercept 
and 
Covariates 
AIC 354.088 362.313 
SC 357.629 387.102 
-2 Log L 352.088 348.313 
 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter DF Estimate Standard 
Error 
W ald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -0.1758 0.4176 0.1771 0.6739 
Strength of view 1 0.0964 0.1342 0.5161 0.4725 
Male 1 0.3449 0.2660 1.6821 0.1946 
Expertise 1 -0.1120 0.1942 0.3324 0.5642 
Inv. Experience 1 0.1410 0.2711 0.2704 0.6031 
NFC 1 -0.00973 0.0445 0.0477 0.8272 
FI 1 -0.0332 0.0526 0.3973 0.5285 
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7.2.5. OLS-regression 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0,31277622
R Square 0,09782896
Adjusted R Square 0,08997033
Standard Error 1,17047615
Observations 580
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 85,274 17,055 12,449 0,000
Residual 574 786,388 1,370
Total 579 871,662
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 2,584 0,125 20,722 0,000 2,339 2,829
Professional (d) -0,404 0,122 -3,314 0,001 -0,643 -0,165
Laypeople (d) -0,794 0,124 -6,385 0,000 -1,038 -0,550
Male (d) 0,239 0,104 2,286 0,023 0,034 0,444
NFC 0,002 0,016 0,115 0,908 -0,030 0,034
FI 0,063 0,018 3,537 0,000 0,028 0,099 
 
7.3. Questionnaire sheets 
This section includes the questionnaire sheets used in the field surveys. The order of the 
questionnaires is:  
 
1. professional group 1, phase 1  
2. professional group 1, phase 2  
3. professional group 2, phase 1  
4. professional group 2, phase 2  
5. professional group 3, phase 1  
6. professional group 3, phase 2 
7. student group, phase 1 
8. student group phase 2 
9. laypeople group, phase 1 
10. laypeople group, phase 2  

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Tunniste (puhelinnumeron 4 viimeistä numeroa): _____________ 
 
Tutkimuksen ensimmäisessä vaiheessa pyysimme teitä valitsemaan periodilla 26.9.2008 – 17.10.2008 paremmin 
menestyvät kohteet kolmesta parista, ennustamaan paremmin kehittyvien kohteiden tuotot periodilla sekä 
asettamaan tuotoille 90% varmuutta vastaavat raja-arvot. Alla näet kohteiden toteutuneet tuotot (paremmin 
menestynyt kohde ympyröity). 
 
Venäläiset osakkeet, tuotto:      Brasilialaiset osakkeet, tuotto: 
SEK, tuotto:        GBP, tuotto: 
Öljy, tuotto:       Kulta, tuotto: 
 
Palauta nyt mieleesi edellisellä kerralla tekemäsi valinnat sekä antamasi arviot. Tehtäväsi on täyttää edellisellä kerralla 
antamasi vastaukset alla oleviin laatikoihin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Valintani paremmin menestyväksi kohteesta, ympyröi   Venäjä  Brasilia 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi   Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, % __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, % __________   Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, % __________ 
Valintani paremmin menestyväksi kohteesta, ympyröi   SEK  GBP 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi   Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, % __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, % __________   Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, % __________ 
Valintani paremmin menestyväksi kohteesta, ympyröi   Öljy  Kulta 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi   Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, % __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, % __________   Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, % __________ 
Käännä -> 
Seuraavassa osiossa esitetään kolmen kohdeparin kehitys viimeiseltä 12 kuukaudelta. Tehtäväsi on valita parista 
periodilla 21.10.2008 – 31.12.2008 paremmin menestyvä kohde, luokitella näkemyksesi voimakkuus, ennustaa 
paremmin kehittyvän kohteen tuotto periodilla sekä asettaa sellaiset raja-arvot, millä välillä kohteen tuotto periodilla 
on 90% todennäköisyydellä.     
          
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
          
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kiitos osallistum isestasi! 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
Venäjä   Brasilia 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, % __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, % __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, % __________ 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
SEK   GBP 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, % __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, % __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, % __________ 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
Öljy   Kulta 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, % __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, % __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, % __________ 
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
Venäläiset vs. Brasilialaiset osakkeet
Venäläiset osakkeet Brasilialaiset osakkeet
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
EU R-GBP vs. EU R-SEK
EU R-GBP EU R-SEK
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Ö ljy vs. Kulta
Brent-Öljy Kulta
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Sukupuoli: Nainen Mies  
Ikä:  18-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-65 
Kuinka monta vuotta olet ollut töissä tekemisissä rahoitus/sijoitusasioiden kanssa? __________ 
Tunniste (puhelinnumeron 4 viimeistä numeroa): _____________ 
Olen osallistunut aiemmin Markku Kaustian pitämään koulutukseen/esitykseen? Kyllä Ei 
 
 
Vastaa seuraaviin väittämiin ympyröimällä parhaiten itseäsi kuvaava vaihtoehto asteikolla täysin eri mieltä (1) – 
täysin samaa mieltä (5) 
Jonkin asian ajatteleminen pitkään ja hartaasti tuottaa minulle vain vähän tyydytystä   1  2  3  4  5 
Luotan alkuperäisiin tunteisiini ihmisistä         1  2  3  4  5 
Teen mieluummin ajatteluani haastavia asioita kuin jotain vain vähän ajattelua vaativaa   1  2  3  4  5 
Luotan omiin vaistoihini           1  2  3  4  5 
Pidän enemmän monimutkaisista kuin yksinkertaisista ongelmista     1  2  3  4  5 
Yritän välttää tilanteita, jotka vaativat syvällistä ajattelua      1  2  3  4  5 
Ihmisten luotettavuuden arvioinnissa voin yleensä luottaa omaan intuitiooni    1  2  3  4  5 
Ihmisistä muodostamani ensivaikutelmat ovat lähes aina oikeita      1  2  3  4  5 
En halua joutua tekemään paljoa ajatustyötä        1  2  3  4  5 
Voin yleensä tuntea jos joku on oikeassa tai väärässä, vaikka en voikaan selittää sitä   1  2  3  4  5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Käännä -> 
Seuraavassa osiossa esitetään kolmen kohdeparin kehitys viimeiseltä 12 kuukaudelta. Tehtäväsi on valita parista 
periodilla 3.10.2008 – 28.11.2008 paremmin menestyvä kohde, luokitella näkemyksesi voimakkuus, ennustaa 
paremmin kehittyvän kohteen tuotto periodilla sekä asettaa sellaiset raja-arvot, millä välillä kohteen tuotto periodilla 
on 90%  todennäköisyydellä.     
          
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
          
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kiitos osallistumisestasi! 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
Venäjä   Brasilia 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
EU R-SEK EU R-G BP 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
Ö ljy   Kulta 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
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Tutkimuksen ensimmäisessä vaiheessa pyysimme teitä valitsemaan periodilla 3.10.2008 – 28.11.2008 paremmin 
menestyvät kohteet kolmesta parista, ennustamaan paremmin kehittyvien kohteiden tuotot periodilla sekä 
asettamaan tuotoille 90%  varmuutta vastaavat raja-arvot. Alla näet kohteiden toteutuneet tuotot (paremmin 
menestynyt kohde ympyröity). 
 
Venäläiset osakkeet, tuotto: -30%     Brasilialaiset osakkeet, tuotto: -22%  
SEK, tuotto: -5,4%       G BP, tuotto: -5,9%  
Ö ljy, tuotto: -41%       Kulta, tuotto: -2%  
 
Palauta nyt mieleesi edellisellä kerralla tekemäsi valinnat sekä antamasi arviot. Tehtäväsi on täyttää edellisellä kerralla 
antamasi vastaukset alla oleviin laatikoihin. On tärkeää, että vastaat vaikka et tarkasti muistaisikaan omia vastauksiasi. 
Tarvittaessa arvioi/päättele omat aiemmat vastauksesi. Luokittele myös se, kuinka hyvin muistat vastauksesi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Muistan hyvin huonosti   1  2  3  4  5 Muistan erittäin tarkasti 
Valintani paremmin menestyväksi kohteesta, ympyröi   Venäjä  Brasilia 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi   Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________   A laraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Valintani paremmin menestyväksi kohteesta, ympyröi   SEK  G BP 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi   Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________   A laraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Valintani paremmin menestyväksi kohteesta, ympyröi   Ö ljy  Kulta 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi   Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________   A laraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Käännä -> 
Tunniste (puhelinnumeron 4 viimeistä numeroa): _____________ 
Seuraavassa osiossa esitetään kolmen kohdeparin kehitys viimeiseltä 12 kuukaudelta. Tehtäväsi on valita parista 
periodilla 5.12.2008 – 31.12.2008 paremmin menestyvä kohde, luokitella näkemyksesi voimakkuus, ennustaa 
paremmin kehittyvän kohteen tuotto periodilla sekä asettaa sellaiset raja-arvot, millä välillä kohteen tuotto periodilla 
on 90%  todennäköisyydellä.     
          
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
          
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kiitos osallistumisestasi! 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
Venäjä   Brasilia 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
SEK   G BP 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
Ö ljy   Kulta 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Venäläiset vs. Brasilialaiset osakkeet
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Venäläiset osakkeet Brasilialaiset osakkeet
EU R-GBP vs. EU R-SEK
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Ö ljy Kulta
 This questionnaire is part of a Master’s Thesis study at H SE. The questionnaire contains tw o sides. The first side asks 
for background information. The second side contains investment related questions. Please make sure you answer all 
questions on both sides of the paper, otherw ise your answ ers can not be used. If you are unsure about some answ ers, 
make a guess anyw ay. The study has tw o phases, the first one today and the second one on 14.11.2008 (also a CoFi 
exercise session). It is important to participate in both phases – there w ill be a reward for everyone participating in the 
second phase. How ever, please answ er now  even if you can’t participate in the second phase. 
 
Sex: Female Male  
Age:  18-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-65 
Major: _________________________________ 
H ave you made any stock market investments yourself? Yes  No 
D o you have any w ork experience in the field of finance? If yes, how  many years? ____________ 
Matching code (= last 4 digits of your phone number): _____________ (needed to match your 2nd phase answ ers) 
 
A nsw er the follow ing statements by circulating the choice that best describes yourself on the scale totally disagree 
(1) – totally agree (5) 
Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction    1  2  3  4  5 
I trust my initial feelings about people          1  2  3  4  5 
I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather       
 than something that requires little thought       1  2  3  4  5 
I believe in trusting my hunches          1  2  3  4  5 
I prefer complex to simple problems         1  2  3  4  5 
I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something     1  2  3  4  5 
W hen it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my "gut feelings"     1  2  3  4  5 
My initial impressions of people are almost alw ays right       1  2  3  4  5 
I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking        1  2  3  4  5 
I can usually feel w hen a person is right or w rong even if I can't explain how  I know    1  2  3  4  5 
 
Turn -> 
The follow ing section show s the development of three asset pairs from the past 12 months. Your task is to choose the 
better performing asset from the pair during the period of 20.10.2008 to 12.11.2008 and classify the strength of your 
view .  In addition you are asked to give an estimate for the return of the better performing asset and set a 90%  
confidence interval limits for the return (i.e. limits betw een w hich the return is w ith 90%  probability).   
          
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
 
 
          
 
 
  
 
          
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating! 
Note: The currency graphs are inverted, i.e., w hen the graph 
goes up, investment value goes dow n. 
Better performing asset on the period, circulate 
Russia  Brazil 
Strength of your view , circulate 
Pure guess     1  2  3  4  5     Strong view  
Estimated return of the w inner, %   _______ 
U pper limit for the return, %   _______ 
Low er limit for the return, %   _______ 
Better performing asset on the period, circulate 
SEK   G BP 
Strength of your view , circulate 
Pure guess     1  2  3  4  5     Strong view  
Estimated return of the w inner, %   _______ 
U pper limit for the return, %   _______ 
Low er limit for the return, %   _______ 
Better performing asset on the period, circulate 
Oil  G old 
Strength of your view , circulate 
Pure guess     1  2  3  4  5     Strong view  
Estimated return of the w inner, %   _______ 
U pper limit for the return, %   _______ 
Low er limit for the return, %   _______ 
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Matching code (= last 4 digits of your phone number): _____________ (needed to match your 1st phase answ ers) 
In first phase of the study you w ere asked to choose the better performing assets from the three pairs on 20.10.2008 
to 12.11.2008 period. In addition you w ere asked to estimate the return of the better performing asset and set 90%  
confidence interval limits for the return. H ere you can see the realized returns (asset w ith higher return is circulated, 
i.e. the w inner). 
 
Russian shares, return: +6%      Brazilian shares, return: -15%  
SEK, return: -1.6%       G BP, return: -6.7%  
Oil, return: -24%       G old, return: -9%  
 
Now  try to remember the answ ers and estimates you gave last time. Your task now  is to fill the answ ers from the first 
phase to the boxes below . It is very important that you answ er now  even though you could not remember you initial 
answ ers very w ell. If so, please estimate/conclude your initial answ ers. Classify also how  w ell you can remember your 
initial answ ers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turn -> 
My selection for the better performing asset, circulate   Russia  Brazil 
Strength of your view , circulate     Pure guess      1  2  3  4  5      Strong view  
Estimated return of the w inner, %  __________ 
U pper limit for the return, %  __________   Low er limit for the return, %  __________ 
My selection for the better performing asset, circulate   SEK  G BP 
Strength of your view , circulate     Pure guess      1  2  3  4  5      Strong view  
Estimated return of the w inner, %  __________ 
U pper limit for the return, %  __________   Low er limit for the return, %  __________ 
My selection for the better performing asset, circulate   Oil  G old 
Strength of your view , circulate     Pure guess      1  2  3  4  5      Strong view  
Estimated return of the w inner, %  __________ 
U pper limit for the return, %  __________   Low er limit for the return, %  __________ 
I remember poorly  1  2  3  4  5  I remember clearly 
The follow ing section show s the development of three asset pairs from the past 12 months. Your task is to choose the 
better performing asset from the pair during the period of 17.11.2008 to 31.12.2008 and classify the strength of your 
view .  In addition you are asked to give an estimate for the return of the better performing asset and set a 90%  
confidence interval limits for the return (i.e. limits betw een w hich the return is w ith 90%  probability).   
          
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
 
 
          
 
 
  
 
          
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating! 
Note: The currency graphs are inverted, i.e., w hen the graph 
goes up, investment value goes dow n. 
Better performing asset on the period, circulate 
Russia  Brazil 
Strength of your view , circulate 
Pure guess     1  2  3  4  5     Strong view  
Estimated return of the w inner, %   _______ 
U pper limit for the return, %   _______ 
Low er limit for the return, %   _______ 
Better performing asset on the period, circulate 
SEK   G BP 
Strength of your view , circulate 
Pure guess     1  2  3  4  5     Strong view  
Estimated return of the w inner, %   _______ 
U pper limit for the return, %   _______ 
Low er limit for the return, %   _______ 
Better performing asset on the period, circulate 
Oil  G old 
Strength of your view , circulate 
Pure guess     1  2  3  4  5     Strong view  
Estimated return of the w inner, %   _______ 
U pper limit for the return, %   _______ 
Low er limit for the return, %   _______ 
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Sukupuoli: Nainen Mies  
Ikä:  18-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-65 
Koulutus:______________________________________________ 
Arvioi kuinka hyvin tunnet rahoitusmarkkinoita:  H yvin vähän 1  2  3  4  5 Erittäin hyvin 
Oletko itse tehnyt osakesijoituksia? Kyllä Ei 
Tunniste (puhelinnumeron 4 viimeistä numeroa): _____________ 
 
 
Vastaa seuraaviin väittämiin ympyröimällä parhaiten itseäsi kuvaava vaihtoehto asteikolla täysin eri mieltä (1) – 
täysin samaa mieltä (5) 
Jonkin asian ajatteleminen pitkään ja hartaasti tuottaa minulle vain vähän tyydytystä   1  2  3  4  5 
Luotan alkuperäisiin tunteisiini ihmisistä         1  2  3  4  5 
Teen mieluummin ajatteluani haastavia asioita kuin jotain vain vähän ajattelua vaativaa   1  2  3  4  5 
Luotan omiin vaistoihini           1  2  3  4  5 
Pidän enemmän monimutkaisista kuin yksinkertaisista ongelmista     1  2  3  4  5 
Yritän välttää tilanteita, jotka vaativat syvällistä ajattelua      1  2  3  4  5 
Ihmisten luotettavuuden arvioinnissa voin yleensä luottaa omaan intuitiooni    1  2  3  4  5 
Ihmisistä muodostamani ensivaikutelmat ovat lähes aina oikeita      1  2  3  4  5 
En halua joutua tekemään paljoa ajatustyötä        1  2  3  4  5 
Voin yleensä tuntea jos joku on oikeassa tai väärässä, vaikka en voikaan selittää sitä   1  2  3  4  5 
 
 
 
 
Käännä -> 
Seuraavassa osiossa esitetään kolmen kohdeparin kehitys viimeiseltä 12 kuukaudelta. Tehtäväsi on valita parista 
periodilla 31.10.2008 – 25.11.2008 paremmin menestyvä kohde, luokitella näkemyksesi voimakkuus, ennustaa 
paremmin kehittyvän kohteen tuotto periodilla sekä asettaa sellaiset raja-arvot, millä välillä kohteen tuotto periodilla 
on 90%  todennäköisyydellä.     
          
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
 
 
          
 
 
       
 
          
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kiitos osallistumisestasi! 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
Venäjä   Brasilia 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
SEK   G BP 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
Ö ljy   Kulta 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
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Kuvaaja euron arvona ko. valuutassa (ts. kuvaajan mennessä ylös 
ko. valuutan arvo heikkenee) 
  
 
Tutkimuksen ensimmäisessä vaiheessa pyysimme teitä valitsemaan periodilla 31.10.2008 – 25.11.2008 paremmin 
menestyvät kohteet kolmesta parista, ennustamaan paremmin kehittyvien kohteiden tuotot periodilla sekä 
asettamaan tuotoille 90%  varmuutta vastaavat raja-arvot. Alla näet kohteiden toteutuneet tuotot (paremmin 
menestynyt kohde ympyröity). 
 
Venäläiset osakkeet, tuotto: -12%     Brasilialaiset osakkeet, tuotto: -17%  
SEK, tuotto: -3,7%       G BP, tuotto: -7,6%  
Ö ljy, tuotto: -25%       Kulta, tuotto: +14%  
 
Palauta nyt mieleesi edellisellä kerralla tekemäsi valinnat sekä antamasi arviot. Tehtäväsi on täyttää edellisellä kerralla 
antamasi vastaukset alla oleviin laatikoihin. On tärkeää, että vastaat vaikka et tarkasti muistaisikaan omia vastauksiasi. 
Tarvittaessa arvioi/päättele omat aiemmat vastauksesi. Luokittele myös se, kuinka hyvin muistat vastauksesi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Muistan hyvin huonosti   1  2  3  4  5 Muistan erittäin tarkasti 
Valintani paremmin menestyväksi kohteesta, ympyröi   Venäjä  Brasilia 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi   Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________   A laraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Valintani paremmin menestyväksi kohteesta, ympyröi   SEK  G BP 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi   Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________   A laraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Valintani paremmin menestyväksi kohteesta, ympyröi   Ö ljy  Kulta 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi   Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________   A laraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Käännä -> 
Tunniste (puhelinnumeron 4 viimeistä numeroa): _____________ 
Seuraavassa osiossa esitetään kolmen kohdeparin kehitys viimeiseltä 12 kuukaudelta. Tehtäväsi on valita parista 
periodilla 28.11.2008 – 31.12.2008 paremmin menestyvä kohde, luokitella näkemyksesi voimakkuus, ennustaa 
paremmin kehittyvän kohteen tuotto periodilla sekä asettaa sellaiset raja-arvot, millä välillä kohteen tuotto periodilla 
on 90%  todennäköisyydellä.     
          
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
          
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kiitos osallistumisestasi! 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
Venäjä   Brasilia 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
SEK   G BP 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Loppuperiodilla paremmin menestyy, ympyröi 
Ö ljy   Kulta 
Varmuus ennusteen osumisesta, ympyröi 
Puhdas arvaus     1  2  3  4  5     Vahva näkemys 
Ennuste voittajan tuotosta, %  __________ 
Yläraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
Alaraja voittajan tuotolle, %  __________ 
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